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4 The Danish Organic Vegetable Chain, FOI 
Preface 
The purpose of the report is to analyze the development of the Danish organic vegeta-
ble chain and present possibilities for producer actions to promote further economic 
growth in the organic vegetable sector. Two commodities have been chosen as case 
studies: organic carrots and iceberg salad. 
 
In the report emphasis is placed on identifying the economic forces and structural 
changes within the organic vegetable chain, focusing on power and how firms along 
the supply chain act or counteract as well as how market transactions are carried out. 
 
The report is part of a research project supported by the Danish Research Centre for 
Organic Farming (DARCOF II), which is entitled “Future supply and marketing 
strategies in the Danish organic food-sector”. This total research project contains also 
an analysis on the development of the organic pork sector and includes the education 
of a Ph.D. candidate. 
 
The work in the report has been carried out by researcher and Ph.D. student Paul Rye 
Kledal, while Research Director Mogens Lund and senior advisor Johannes Christen-
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Summary 
The Danish organic vegetable chain has a primary production base of 160 farms cov-
ering an arable land of 729 ha. The 160 farms accounts for 21 per cent of all Danish 
vegetable farms, and the 729 ha covers 11 per cent of the total land used for vegetable 
production in Denmark (2003). 
 
The four most important organic vegetable crops in terms of tonnes produced and ar-
able land employed are carrots, onions, cabbage and salads. Together these four crops 
account for 83 per cent of all organic vegetables produced in tonnes, and take up 58 
per cent of the arable land used for organic vegetable production. 
 
From the total sales of organic food and beverages, amounting to approximately 2 bil-
lion DKK (2004), organic vegetables accounted for 237 Mio. DKK (12 per cent). Or-
ganic vegetables were the second largest product group in retail sales in value terms 
(2004). Carrots were by far the largest single vegetable sold covering a sale of 88 
Mio. DKK – 37 per cent of all organic vegetables sold. 
 
Denmark imported for 59 Mio. DKK organic vegetables (11 per cent of total organic 
food import value), and exported for 19 Mio. DKK (7 per cent of total organic food 
export value) in 2004. 
 
The organic vegetable chain is a fairly short and simple chain that can be conceived 
as consisting of three major nodes: the input factor suppliers, the vegetable producers 
and the consumers. The links where complexity starts to rise are between the nodes of 
producers and consumers, with a wide variety of ways organic vegetables are distrib-
uted and consumed. 
 
For analyzing the development and changes in the Danish organic vegetable chain fo-
cus on bargain power and control over access to critical resources and residual earn-
ings has laid the foundation for the theoretical and methodological approach. 
 
Through qualitative interviews of key players in the nodes along the supply chain it 
was revealed that bargain power was exercised between producers in control of pack-
aging and the retailers. Two commodities were chosen for more in depth analyzes on 
the governance structure between the node of packaging and retailing: organic carrots 
and iceberg salad. The choice of these two commodities was, besides carrots being 
the most produced and sold organic vegetable, also to examine if the differences in 
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durability after harvest would have any effect on the governance structure between 
packagers and retailers.  
 
The qualitative analyzes revealed an increasing bargain power in favour of the retail-
ers through their different and variable types of fees, packaging requirements towards 
the producers as well as an extension of the period of credit. The increasing bargain 
power in favour of the retailers has parallel with technological and organizational im-
provements along the chain led to several economic changes among the vegetable 
producers. However, to document this in quantitative manner only valuable data were 
obtainable on the organic carrots.  
 
The economic analyzes, on both conventional and organic carrot producers, showed 
first of all, that there has been a concentration of the production on fewer and larger 
farms. Secondly, the terms of trade have been mostly negative on average for the or-
ganic carrot producers in comparison with the conventional. Thirdly, there has been a 
contraction between organic and conventional consumer prices on carrots, with a sta-
tistical significant decline in the organic prices, but stable for the conventional. 
 
The reasons for these changes were explained by key players along the chain as  
 
1) large scale professional conventional carrot producers started to enter the 
market when it was beneficial for their size of production 
2) the entry of these newcomers broke the oligopoly held by the pioneers of the 
organic vegetable farmers and their producer organization, by offering lower 
prices. Previously, the organic vegetable producers and their producer or-
ganization negotiated price and expected total output with the retailers 
3) retailers now negotiate price and expected sale with each individual producer 
typically on a weekly basis  
4) the growth and expansion of the discount chains and their marketing of the 
most sold organic vegetables like carrots and onions, have raised competition 
in retailing in general and trickled a downwards price pressure towards the 
suppliers 
 
Future possibilities for producer actions to promote further growth and sustain control 
over residuals were examined. 
 
Since 80 per cent of all organic food sales go through retailing analyzes on this matter 
moved towards the development in retailing documenting the growth in discount 
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stores and large supermarkets. In this report the concept of ‘the organic basket’ is put 
forward as way for producers to cooperate, control and coordinate sales towards the 
retailers. 
 
The case story from the discount chain ‘Netto’ is an example of how the ‘organic 
basket concept’ has been implemented in reality.  
 
Another possible approach that could take place in the near future was revealed 
trough the interviews of key players in the packaging node. Some of these players 
were planning to create a basket of variety supplying retailers through a trans-
national network of organic producers/packagers. In this way the increasing bargain 
power of the trans-national buyer organizations in retailing could be counter balanced 
by the packagers. Their trans-national network could lower transaction costs towards 
the retailers in relation to the act of purchasing as well as secure the need for scale. 
The producers/packagers themselves would appropriate control and ownership of a 
critical supply chain resource with relatively high utility and scarcity and thereby se-
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1. Introduction     
1.1. Project background 
During the second half of the 1990’s the Danish organic sector, like in many other 
countries of the North, experienced a strong and steady growth in sales, number of 
farms and arable land converting to organic production. However, in many countries 
the growth in organic food was often carried out within a few commodity groups. In 
the Danish case it was first and foremost the dairy sector that supported the fast 
growth in the 90’s, reaching a market share in consumer milk of around 30 per cent. 
 
Parallel to the economic growth in the organic sector the Institute of Food and Re-
source Economics was involved in a research project called the “Potential of organic 
farming in a sustainable development” analyzing the growth potentials for organic 
farming in Denmark. A part of this project was a socio-economic study interviewing 
conventional farmers to ascertain the characteristics of whom the potential organic 
farmer were, the commodities they pictured themselves producing and the various 
barriers they were expecting during their considerations of converting to organic 
(Kledal, 2000 & 2001). 
 
Some of the conclusions were that organic dairy production would cease to grow, 
whereas new areas of potential growth were within pork and plant/vegetable produc-
tion. The potential organic farmer was a person between 20 and 44, and would have a 
small to medium size farm. 
 
Since organic vegetable production was relatively unexamined concerning various 
socio-economic aspects like farm types, production costs, market potentials and pos-
sible distribution channels as well as consumer preferences, this organic commodity 
sector was chosen for further research examining the growth potentials in the future 
supply of organic foods. 
1.2. The aim of the project 
The overall aim of this research project is to analyze the future development of the 
Danish organic vegetable chain with two commodities chosen as case studies: 
 
- Organic carrots 
- Organic iceberg salad 
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Emphasis is placed on identifying the economic forces and changes within the organic 
vegetable chain, focusing on power and how firms along the supply chain act or 
counter act upon it, as well as how market transactions is carried out.  
 
By linking the research results of economic changes with the behaviour of various 
firms and nodes along the supply chain in relation to power, the aim is to 
 
1) identify and explain the development of the Danish organic vegetable chain 
and provide with useful supply strategies stimulating growth among produc-
ers 
2) contribute to new theoretical and methodological approaches in agro-food 
supply studies. 
1.3. The organization of the report 
This report is first of all introducing a new theoretical approach in chapter 2 analyzing 
the development of the organic market by focusing on power and conflicts over ac-
cess to critical resources as a way to explain dynamics and changes. Methodologi-
cally, quantitative data has been utilized and compared with qualitative data gathered 
through interviews with key players along the organic vegetable chain, and described 
in chapter 3. 
 
Chapter 4 is first a general overview of the historical development of the organic 
vegetable chain in Denmark identifying the changing institutional settings from 1980 
up till now. Then the network of the chain with major nodes and links is described, 
and the import level, the national production base and sales channels as well as ex-
ports of vegetables is illustrated and compared with all organic market products. 
 
Chapter 5 is using the case studies of organic carrots and iceberg salad to analyze 
more in depth the development of the governance structure in producer-retailer rela-
tions illustrating how retail bargain power is exercised and increasing. Equally, analy-
sis has been made on terms of trade, price contractions between organic and conven-
tional as well as calculations on retailer gross profit margins on organic carrots. 
 
Chapter 6 examines the changes taken place in retailing and introduces the concept of 
a ‘basket of variety’ to explain why there has been this change and shift in power 
from food suppliers to retailers. The ‘organic basket’ is put forward as an example of 
how organic producers can lower transaction cost towards retailers as well as counter 
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balance their bargain power, and regain ownership and control over organic as a criti-
cal resource along the supply chain.  
 








14 The Danish Organic Vegetable Chain, FOI 
 
2. Theory 
2.1. Property rights, power and the organic farmer 
In the world of economists property rights to an asset consists of three elements (Hart, 
1995; Barzel, 1997):  
 
1. The right to consume or dispose a good 
2. The right to control the making or exchange of a good 
3. The right to appropriate specific or residual earnings (that is the net earnings 
that remain after all payments to which it is contractually committed, such as 
wages, interest payments and other input supplies). 
 
These three elements in property rights are also the ones that inherently hands over 
power to the owner of these rights. 
 
According to Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990) and Hart (1995) 
ownership of physical assets (machines, land, capital) gives the owner(s) residual 
control rights over all the attributes of the assets. The residual control makes the 
owner(s) residual claimant(s) to residual earnings that the assets generate. In this way 
specific and residual rights of control over assets automatically transfers residual 
powers to the claimants.    
 
Marxian theories carry a similar approach. The capitalist (employer) who owns the 
means of production (machinery) has the right to appropriate the surplus value from 
the workers hired to generate a value using the means of production. From a Marxian 
point of view the relationship between capital and labour is by nature exploitive be-
cause the specific property relations, where the capitalist owns the physical assets, 
automatically hands over power to the capitalist (M.N. Ryndina & Tjernikov, 1980).  
 
However, Rajan & Zingales (1998b) argues that the ownership of physical assets is 
not the only source of power within a firm, nor necessarily the most effective in pro-
moting relationship-specific investments. Within the assumptions of the property 
rights literature, they identify an alternative, possible non-contractual, mechanism to 
allocate power: access. They define access as the ability to use, or work with, a criti-
cal resource. A critical resource can be a machine, an idea or a person. The agent who 
is given privileged access to the resource gets according to Rajan & Zingales no new 
residuals rights of control. All the agent gets: is the opportunity to specialise his/her 
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human capital to the resource and make him/her self valuable and hence get control 
over the critical resource as a source of power. 
 
From a similar point of view Cox et al. (2002:3) define power “as the ability of a firm 
(or an entrepreneur) to own and control critical assets in markets and supply chains 
that allow it to sustain its ability to appropriate and accumulate value for itself by 
constantly leveraging its customers, competitors and suppliers”. 
 
The concept of critical assets is based on the idea that, within any supply chain, some 
of the resources that are used to deliver an end product or service are highly valued in 
utility terms by a large number of buyers or suppliers and are relatively scarce or 
unique in ownership, by virtue difficult, or sometimes impossible, to copy. It is in this 
combination of high utility and relative scarcity that enables particular supply chain 
resources to become critical assets both in buyer-supplier exchange and in market 
context. 
 
Both Rajan & Zingales and Cox et al. use critical resources or critical assets as a rela-
tional term, and both imply that there are no fundamental changes in the property re-
lations. Hence, changes in the power structures do not occur. Cox et al. (2002:7-8) 
argue “that the majority of critical assets will provide the firm that possesses them 
with only temporary opportunity to earn rents. This is because other entrepreneurs or 
entrepreneurial firms will be constantly looking for ways in which the resources un-
derpinning a critical asset can be imitated or substituted”. Cox et al. claim that there 
are essentially three main mechanisms through which firms without critical assets 
might seek to reconfigure the existing structure of power in any particular market or 
supply chain: product innovation, process innovation and supply chain innovation. 
 
By choosing organic agriculture as a production method or idea, the farmer would, in 
line with Rajan & Zingales, get access to a critical asset. This access gives the organic 
farmer the opportunity to specialise his/her human capital to the asset and make 
him/her valuable, and hence get control over the critical resource. The specific and 
residual right of control over the critical asset generates a source of power. Following 
Cox et al. this power and control over organic production as a critical asset, enabling 
appropriation and accumulation of value or above normal profits, will only be tempo-
rary. Hence, organic producers will only be able to control their products as a critical 
asset as long as it is valued high in utility terms and in the same time delivers some-
thing relatively scarce or unique in ownership along the supply chain. 
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Appropriation of above normal profits being only temporarily would also be in line 
with the Treadmill theory and its claims on firm behaviour in relation to profit devel-
opment (Cochrane, 1958). Cochrane showed that where farmers continuously attempt 
to improve their incomes by adopting new cost-reducing technologies and acquiring 
more land to achieve larger scale of production, the more production will go up and 
price go down due to the demand-supply mechanism in the market. Consequently, 
profits from adaptations that lower production costs are countered by a lower price of 
the product, and profits expected by the adaptation of new technology do not materi-
alize. 
 
However, the cost of securing property rights and secure critical assets will arise 
wherever two or more parties transact across technologically separable interface. 
Such technologically separable interfaces are usually called nodes or links connected 
to a commodity chain or a food network.  
 
Within the framework of critical agro-food research food filieres, food networks, sys-
tems of provision and commodity chains are well established concepts and approaches 
unveiling the different forces acting upon the commodity flows from producer to con-
sumer (Fine, 1994 and Fine et al. 1996; Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1986; Lockie & 
Kitto, 2000). 
 
The Global commodity chain approach (GCC) has attracted significant attention from 
the early 1990’s and its focal distinction introduced by Gerrefi (1994) between pro-
ducer-driven and buyer-driven chains, has generated a number of case studies. The 
type of driver in the chain is determined by the location of market power and ability 
to keep up barriers of entry. 
 
A strong point of the GCC approach is its inclusion of power in economic relations 
and transactions in international production and trading relations. One important as-
pect is that power is seen not simply as the effect of barriers of entry, but also organ-
izational changes and more effective ‘supply chain management’ implemented by key 
agents (Raikes, Jensen & Ponte, 2000). 
 
However, at each juncture between the nodes, trans-actors face a decision of how to 
govern their relationship. Their joint interest is to undertake activities that enhance 
total surplus. But each transaction involves a potential source of conflict, because 
both parties try to maximize their own surplus value. Organizations and institutions 
are from the transaction cost perspective the means which trans-actors attempt to 
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regulate this behaviour. The broad goal is to adopt governance structures that promote 
efficient adaptations while economizing on the costs of reaching agreements and re-
solving disputes (Masten, 2000). 
 
Boehlje & Schrader (1995:15-16) argue that there are two fundamental points of con-
trol and one fundamental source of power in a negotiation based coordinated food 
production and distribution system. The first point of control is the end user (the con-
sumer) and those firms that have intimate contact with the consumer (supermar-
kets/retailers). The second is the raw material supplier, depending on the sustainabil-
ity of their contribution to the production/distribution process. Here they point out 
specifically the owners of genetics. The one fundamental source of power, at the two 
ends of the supply chain they argue, is knowledge. 
 
The organic farmers would in line with these aspects on economic changes along a 
supply chain endeavour increasing market power exercised from the end nodes, and  
be forced to either grow in farm- and production size or find alternative ways of orga-
nizing sales to secure greater control over distribution and price along the chain. 
 
In this regard Williamson (1985) proposed the analysis of the firm as governance 
structures. Given the institutional environment, the efficient governance structure is 
derived from the transaction’s attributes. By the analysis of the specificity of the as-
sets, the frequency and the uncertainty involved in the transactions, an efficient gov-
ernance structure is expected. 
 
When focusing on transaction costs three types of governance structures are relevant: 
 
- simple market exchange 
- contracting 
- internal organization (vertical integration)  
 
In simple market transactions, parties are generally free to bargain or not bargain as 
they prefer. Moreover, once a transaction is consummated, the parties have relatively 
few ongoing obligations and may, for example, use or dispose of the items procured 
in whatever manner they choose. 
 
By contracting trans-actors can attempt to limit free riding by defining the range of 
acceptable behaviour. Contracts can also serve to attenuate hold-up problems by 
 
18 The Danish Organic Vegetable Chain, FOI 
stipulating terms of trade ex-ante, thereby reducing the prospect of costly repetitive 
bargaining. 
 
With internal organization hold-up opportunities can be limited by allocating residual 
rights of control over the use and disposition of assets, and thereby restrict the ability 
of non-owners to withhold assets from production. 
 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1979) note that contracting par-
ties with transaction-specific assets put themselves in a position of being held up at 
renegotiation when they use short-term contracts. The possibility of hold-up occurs 
because each party could potentially extract, during renegotiation, the other’s quasi 
rents once the investments were made. The hold-up situation is one of the main eco-
nomic explanations to why farmers often organize themselves in cooperatives (or 
down stream vertical integration). 
 
A typical asset specificity in agriculture, that opens up for hold-up situations and 
asymmetric bargain positions, is ‘time’ or the temporal specificities within the various 
commodities. Agricultural commodities have a wide range of durability and perisha-
bilty making simple market exchange the most hazardable in relation to farm products 
with a short durability. 
 
The economic development and changing behaviour played out among the organic 
producers, which according to the property rights theory are trying to secure organic 
as a critical asset valued high in utility terms and in the same time delivering some-
thing relatively scarce or unique in ownership along the supply chain, can accordingly 
to the transaction cost theory, be revealed by focusing on how transactions and the 
governance structures are carried out at each node of the chain. 
2.2. Hypotheses 
On the background of the chosen theoretical framework, focusing on power and con-
trol over access to critical resources and residual earnings as well as the governance 
structures applied to protect the property rights of the firms along the organic vegeta-
ble chain, the following hypotheses have been formulated and are going to be tested 
 
1. The above normal profits in organic farming are only temporary for produc-
ers operating in open competitive markets  
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2. Power in the food supply chain will be strongest in the first node concerning 
input supplies to the farm node, and at the end of the chain in the node of dis-
tribution (retailers/wholesalers) supplying consumers  
 
3. Differences in time specificity concerning durability on the chosen agro 
commodities, organic carrots and organic iceberg salad, will influence the 
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3.  Methodology and delimitation 
For the study of the development of the organic vegetable chain the following ap-
proach was adopted. 
  
Firstly, the methodological approach is structured around Williamson’s four levels of 
analysis approaches (Williamson, 2000), using the second level. This level is focusing 
on governance structures dealing with contracts and transactions. In this case, the 
supply chain and network structure in the organic vegetable sector. By delimiting the 
analysis to the second level in Williamson’s methodological approach, the research 
methodology applied can be characterized as a micro analytic approach focusing on 
the actors along the nodes in the supply chain analyzing how transactions on the mar-
ket is carried out. 
 
Secondly, data collection was done by reviewing relevant literature, publications and 
studies to outline the Danish organic vegetable chain although there are few studies 
on that specific sector itself. During this process key players along the chain were 
found. Key players include producers, market operators and procurement officers 
among the retailers. Specific organic consumer or household studies have been delim-
ited from this research, due to the theoretical assumptions that power along a supply 
chain is concentrated in the node of input factors to farms, and at the node of retailing. 
 
The key players chosen along the supply chain were from the beginning surveyed 
through a combination of questionnaires, telephone interviews and face-to-face dis-
cussions. During this process a more open-ended qualitative interview form were used 
to let the key players themselves point out how the network of the organic vegetable 
chain was functioning guided by questions in terms of production flows, contracting 
and power structures along the chain. 
 
Then a second round of interviews were made with a more narrow group of key play-
ers going into depth with the questions on how contracts are negotiated, how power is 
exercised and what prospects they saw for the future concerning the development and 
growth of organic vegetables. During this process a more specific questionnaire was 
used (included in the Annex). 
 
Thirdly, the amount of commodities to analyze and follow along the vegetable chain 
was delimited to organic carrots and iceberg salad. 
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The choice of the two organic vegetables was made for two reasons: 1) their time 
specificity concerning durability is very different with carrots having a long durability 
and iceberg salad a short durability. The question on durability was related to the hy-
pothesis that differences in the time specificity of agro commodities could influence 
the outcome of different governance structures concerning market exchange. 2) Out 
of the ten most sold organic vegetables in Denmark, carrots and iceberg salad are 
each the most sold organic vegetables in relation to their durability. 
 
During the first round of qualitative interviews the proposition from Boehlje & 
Shrader (1995) on power, stating that in a negotiation based coordinated food produc-
tion and distribution system power is exercised through the first and in the node of the 
end of the food chain, was investigated. None of the producers interviewed could re-
late to or agree that power was exercised from the first node concerning input factors 
related to genetics. One carrot producer experimenting with different strains of carrots 
with specific qualities like taste, sweetness, durability in relation to handling in food 
service products, complained that the plant breeders were often very unwilling to pro-
vide him with his requests for special strains. For him this was not a question of mar-
ket power, but more the consequence of the concentration of a few big seed compa-
nies, and him being an organic producer working with a niche of little interest to the 
seed companies. 
 
The question of power along the food chain was overall by the producers expressed as 
coming from the retailers, confirming Boehlje & Schrader that the end user and the 
firms with intimate contact with the consumers, are the point of power and control. 
The results through the qualitative interviews with the producers changed the analytic 
focus away from input suppliers and more specifically to the retailers, analyzing on 
how the governance structure between farm supplier and retail buyer is exercised. 
More specifically how bargain power from retailers is exercised, and how it has 
evolved towards the organic producers. In those analyzes potential future transitions 
in retailing were explored. The purpose was to find new spaces of growth opportuni-
ties for the organic vegetable producers, and in the same time introduce strategies to 
counterbalance some of the bargain power exercised by the retailers. 
 
In relation to the hypothesis that above normal profits in organic farming would only 
be temporary, and connected to the qualitative results that power in the supply chain 
was exercised by the retailers, monthly consumer prices from 1997 to 2000 in two 
competing supermarket- and discount chains - respectively on organic and conven-
tional carrots – was analyzed. A regression model was formulated to calculate if there 
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were any contraction between organic and conventional carrot prices respectively in 
supermarkets and discount stores. Food and Resource Economic Institute (FOI) do 
have the development in consumer prices from 2001 to 2005 in relation to the type of 
store, but are not allowed to publicise them yet.  
 
Producer prices on organic and conventional carrots were collected from the Statistics 
department of FOI from 1998 to 2004, and terms of trade were calculated and com-
pared in relation to clarify the tendency in profit development among organic carrot 
producers. The production of organic iceberg salad was too small to collect valid data. 
 
In relation to the research task of introducing new growth strategies for the organic 
vegetable producers as a sector, the prospects of expanding through the food service 
node was examined both through literature, market reports and qualitative interviews. 
The organic food service sector has so far been driven by a public demand-pull with a 
market turnover of 200 – 400 Mio. DKK. However, the political discourse at the state 
level is dominated by the ideological foundation, that market demand should be the 
driver for growth in organic food service procurement. Parallel to this, a structural re-
form in Denmark has been implemented in 2005 reducing the number of municipali-
ties from 275 to 98, leaving a prospect of status quo concerning expansion of the or-
ganic food service sector through public initiatives in the next couple of years (Sall & 
Sall, 2004:5, 15 & 37). 
  
The private food service sector consists of hotels, restaurants, fast food outlets etc. 
The organic food share is small and unknown, but regarded as having growth oppor-
tunities. However, from the qualitative interviews it encounters constraints in the ar-
eas of product development, delivering- and quality assurance, which to some extent 
could be solved by a public demand-pull targeted with a spill-over effect to the pri-
vate sector. The conclusions and perspectives in this report concerning promoting an 
‘organic basket’ to the retailers offering high utility and low transaction costs could 
also be valuable to the organic food service sector whether the market is private or 
public.  
 
The willingness to respond to interviews and to provide quantitative data differed sig-
nificantly between the contacted persons and firms. But where it has been possible the 
data obtained has been checked against official statistics. Since organic vegetables are 
a rather new area for collecting official statistics, the results from interviewing the 
producers in this research project and checking them against the official statistics, 
have already made ‘Denmark Statistics’ elaborate on their data collection on vegeta-
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bles. The interviews in this research project revealed a certain discrepancy between 
the import/export data given by the organic carrot producers and the official statistics 
on import/export data for organic carrots. 
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4. The Danish Organic vegetable chain 
4.1. Historical background 
The development of organic vegetable production in Denmark is very closely con-
nected to the establishment of the Danish organic farm movement, and related to the 
people starting up the production collective ‘Svanholm estate’ on the main island Zea-
land in 1979. In 1980 the ‘farm group’ at the Svanholm estate started a study circle 
with people representing the various alternative farming systems prevailing at that 
time, trying to form common rules for what alternative farming could be.  
 
The rise of the alternative farm movement in the late 1970’s and 80’s has to be under-
stood in relation to its dialectic production counterpart – the conventional farming - 
which was causing growing environmental problems from pesticide and nitrogen 
residues in ground- and drinking water. Also questions on animal welfare were raised 
as well as problems of antibiotic immunity among humans from the heavy use of 
medicine in industrial farm systems. These debates and environmental topics, stem-
ming from the problems related to conventional farm systems, were part of the dis-
course shaping the development path of the production methods and regulatory set-
ting of alternative farming in the beginning of the 1980’s (Jacobsen, 2005; Guthman, 
2004; Belasco, 1989). 
 
After many debates within the study group, as well as with a large group among the 
alternative farm movement, who felt that Biodynamic farming was too ‘religious’1, 
the Danish Association of Organic Farming (LØJ) was founded in March 1981. Paral-
lel with the foundation of LØJ, the former FDB (now Coop Denmark) invites the 
various alternative farm groups to an open meeting, trying to find out what the pro-
duction possibilities are, after FDB have had many enquiries about sales of alternative 
products. FDB chooses to concentrate on farmers following the rules of LØJ, and 
Poul Henrik Hedeboe from Svanholm becomes the coordinator/contact person be-
tween FDB and the farmers producing under the regulatory regime of LØJ. 
 
FDB buys what existing organic and biodynamic farmers can produce, and Svanholm 
gets a niche producing what FDB would like to promote. Production volume is ar-
ranged for a whole season with a fixed price following the price profile of the season 
(see figure 4.1). Potatoes, onions and carrots are the main crops. This ‘planned econ-
                                                 
1 Using the words of Poul Henrik Hedeboe during one of the qualitative interviews, and head of the 
farm group at Svanholm from the very beginning.  
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omy’ of the organic vegetable production and sales continues till the beginning of the 
90’s. 
 














                
 
                    Winter     spring        summer                 autumn                          Season 
      
 
 
From 1984 to 1986 sales doubled and FDB concentrates heavily on organic products 
from 1986 (See also table 4.1). Svanholm decides the same year to build a packing 
department. From 1988/89 sales in general begins to stagnate and the turnover of or-
ganic products starts to take the form of the S-curve or production ‘Life cycle’ with 
maturity occurring. 
 
Table 4.1.  Actual sales from FDB on organic vegetables from 1981/82 – 1988/89 



















Tonnes 30 100 150 150 300 1,000 3,000 4,000   
Source: The Co-committee and trade association for coordination between Organic and Biodynami c farm-





In 1987 governmental initiatives like the first nationally controlled organic brand – 
the red Ø - as well as various economic support schemes for organic farmers is insti-
tuted. This political acknowledgement of organic farming helped to spur new opti-
mism within the organic movement.  
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In 1988 the independent supermarket chain ‘Irma’ starts to sell organic products. The 
organic vegetable producer’s starts the sales organization ‘Fælles Grønt’, but it closes 
down in 1990 becoming ‘Fælles Grønt Vest’, a sales organization for the organic 
vegetable producers in Jutland. ‘Fælles Grønt Vest’ is later merged in 2000 becoming 
the present sales organization ‘Dan Organic’. Sales of organic products move in gen-
eral from stagnation to a decline in the period of 1988 to 1993.  
 
In 1992 FDB buys the supermarket chain Irma and closes down a year later 52 of its 
shops out of 114. The same year the organic producers starts negotiating with FDB 
about promoting organic products close to traditional food prices on the condition that 
FDB will involve themselves in a heavy marketing effort – later known as the dis-
count promotion on organic products in 1993 which helps to boost sales on all catego-
ries of organic products. 
 
The organic producers on Zealand and Fyn organize themselves in ‘Biodania’ – a 
sales and coordination organization. Production and sales on vegetables are now or-
ganized and negotiated with FDB as a contract stating a specific supply, a specific 
start price and any deviation in price is determined by demand and supply during the 
season. 
 
In 1997 ‘Netto’- the discount chain of ‘Dansk Supermarked’ - starts to sell organic 
vegetables, and overall demand increases from 1997 to 2000. The organic vegetable 
producer’s posses, in accordance with the theory, a critical resource and an end prod-
uct with a high utility and relative scarcity in the supply chain of food. Some organic 
vegetable producers named this period during the interview as “the golden period” 
where they took advantages of their market position. 
 
The rising demand and steady market sales for organic vegetables attract professional 
conventional producers to convert to organic production. However, these new comers 
belonging to the ‘early majority’ are not organized in ‘Biodania’, so to undermine the 
barriers of entry they start to offer the supermarkets lower prices on organic vegeta-
bles.  
 
FDB reacts to the previously ‘hold up’ situation and ex-post opportunism from the 
sales organization ‘Biodania’, and stops buying organic vegetables through them. In-
stead negotiations take place with each individual organic producer. Expected produc-
tion and expected sales are negotiated, but prices are settled every week in relation to 
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demand and supply where producer and supermarket are ‘free’ to sell or buy. From 
governance structure of contracting it now moves towards simple marketing. 
 
Some strong players in ‘Biodania’ like ‘Søris I/S’ choose not to sell its products to 
FDB, but instead through the discount chain Netto.  
 
Since 2000 the pressure on the organic producers’ price and deliverable conditions 
has risen and a general mistrust to FDB is common. From 2003 FDB is split up so 
FDB only takes care of the political part of the coop, whereas the retailing is organ-
ized through ‘Coop Denmark’, which again is organized on a Nordic level within 
‘Coop Nordic’. The mixture of being dependent on FDB’s large market share on or-
ganic products, knowing FDB’s code of conduct and commitment to promote organic 
products, and at the same time experiencing a supermarket chain operating more and 
more on the same premises as the ‘pure capitalistic’ supermarket chains, are a general 
concern and type of argument coming from some of the organic vegetable producers. 
The discount chain ‘Netto’ has so far kept a good reputation among the organic vege-
table producers using a policy of the ‘principal-agent’ in terms of paying a little more, 
but in the same time securing themselves dedicated suppliers. 
 
How the retailer bargain power appears and is carried out in practise will be discussed 
in chapter 5.3. 
4.2. The network and nodes of transactions 
Taking a ‘still-picture’ of today’s supply chain of organic vegetables one finds a fairly 
short and simple chain that can be conceived as consisting of three major nodes: the 
input factor suppliers (seeds, machinery etc.), the vegetable producers and the con-
sumers. The links where complexity starts to rise are between the nodes of producers 
and consumers, indicating the variety of ways organic vegetables are consumed.  
Through the studies of the two chosen vegetables a general network of the Danish or-
ganic vegetable chain has been drawn and illustrated in figure 4.2. 
 
Looking at the network, between producers and consumers, the key agents on pro-
ducer side are a few producers who individually or as a cooperative, control the pack-
ing node. Farmers who pack and sell to retailers have the cost and duty of delivering 
to a retail distribution center. Retailers want to keep transaction costs low, so they are 
interested in only trading with as few producers as possible, but enough to secure 
themselves against ‘hold up’ situations.  
 
28 The Danish Organic Vegetable Chain, FOI 
 






















                                                         
 
























 The Danish Organic Vegetable Chain, FOI 29
Since retailing purchases around 80 per cent of the organic vegetables, the links be-
tween the packing node and the retail distribution center is of importance concerning 
economies of scale, capital accumulation and bargain power (see chapter 4.4 concern-
ing sales channels and their size in market sales).  
 
From the retail distribution center the retailers have their own distribution and logistic 
programme reaching their various types of outlets (hypermarkets, supermarkets, dis-
count etc.).  
 
Other producers have found an ‘alternative distribution channels’ for their products 
creating a farm shop and/or a box scheme where vegetable boxes are delivered di-
rectly to the consumers. This can be either once, twice or every third week. Alterna-
tive distribution channels within organic food like box schemes are economically im-
portant in Denmark. The E-trading box-scheme company ‘Aarstiderne.com’ (Sea-
son.com) has alone around 30 per cent of the market turnover on organic vegetables. 
  
Some producers can have a deal with a local retailer delivering directly some small 
amount or a special vegetable, but this is becoming more rare since independent re-
tailers are declining rapidly and instead they belong to various kinds of chains or 
buyer groups with restrictions on where and what to buy. The same goes for selling 
through wholesalers where the retailers in general have taken over this role them-
selves. But there are a few wholesalers who will solve some transaction costs for or-
ganic producers/packagers concerning sales to retailers or other consumer outlets like 
restaurants and hotels. Other producers can have a direct link to a restaurant or a food-
service company again supplying to various kinds of public institutions like day-care 
centers, schools etc., or private markets like restaurants and hotels. 
 
In the real world one vegetable producer will often consist of several nodes and dis-
tributing to various nodes in the network. For example one producer can have a farm 
shop, own his own packing room delivering to a retail distribution center as well as an 
organic food service firm and a restaurant.  
4.3. The primary production base in the producer node 
In comparison with the overall picture of organic farming in Denmark, the organic 
vegetable production accounts for only a very small share in farms and arable land. In 
2003 the arable land was 729 ha, and has dropped from 1,054 ha in 2000 following 
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the general trend of decline. However this decline has been mainly caused by a de-
cline in the organic carrot production area with approximately 300 ha.  
 
Out of the total land in Denmark used for vegetable production, the organic area with 
its 729 ha accounted for 11 per cent.  The conventional vegetable production had ris-
en 1,265 ha. covering 6,000 ha (Denmark Statistics, 2004). This is shown in figure 
4.3. 
 








Although the arable land for organic vegetable production has declined, the number 
of farms has surprisingly gone up from 142 in 2000 to 160 in 2003, as shown in figure 
4.4. The conventional farms have had a similar increase rising from 570 to 590. The 
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The regional location of the 160 organic vegetable farmers is illustrated in table 4.2. 
The organic vegetable farms are almost distributed fifty-fifty among the islands and 
Jutland. However, the vegetable farms in Jutland and their output in tonnes are at 
much larger sums. This is related to the type of crops grown. Heavier root crops suit-
able for the sandier soils of Jutland like carrots as well as leek and onions dominate in 
comparison with the lighter crops on the islands like salads, broccoli, sugar corn etc. 
Also the fact that organic consumption is related to greater urban areas could have an 
impact on the choice of production and placement of farmers who choose to produce 
organic vegetables, with the main capital Copenhagen being situated on the island of 
Zealand. Especially organic farmers, where the main income is from selling through 
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Table 4.2. Organic vegetable farms and their location in Denmark (2003) 
      






      
No of org. farms 76 48 per cent  84 52 per cent 160 
Hectare 252 35 per cent 477 65 per cent 729 
Tonnes 4,621 29 per cent 11,327 71 per cent 15,948   




The 15,948 tonnes of organic vegetables produced in 2003 amounted approximately 
to 9 per cent of the total vegetable production at 179,759 tonnes. 
 
In table 4.3 a ‘Top ten list’ of what organic vegetable farmers produce in terms of 
hectare used is described in comparison with conventional vegetable production. 
 
As one can see carrots is the most produced organic vegetable in Denmark. Then on-
ions, cabbage and various salads succeed the latter being number four. The organic 
vegetables compared to the conventional follow pretty much each other in terms of 
placement on the ‘top ten list’. The differences are salads in organic vegetable pro-
duction is not on the conventional top ten list, and also more root commodities are 
found among the organic vegetables.  
 
Potatoes do not in the Danish statistics figure as a vegetable, but according to FOI 
special statistics organic potatoes in 2003 occupied 337 ha and the output was 5.600 
tonnes. If one regards potatoes as a vegetable it would be number one in terms of hec-
tare covered for organic vegetable production and number two in terms of output. 
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Table 4.3. The organic and conventional vegetable ‘Top ten list’ 2003 
       
 Organic Conventional 
       
No. Crop Hectares Tonnes Crop Hectares Tonnes 
       
1 Carrot 218.1 9,036 Onion 1,196 42,941 
2 Onion 85.1 2,096 Carrot 1,165 52,950 
3 Cabbage 66.6 1,223 Cauliflower 415 5,531 
4 Salads 57.7 872 Peas 324 1,336 
5 Beetroot 28.9 616 Cabbage 305 14,103 
6 Leek 27.5 410 Leek 302 4,716 
7 Parsley root              27.0 261 Onion (industry) 275 10,073 
8 Celeriac 22.4 330 Other cultures 274 - 
9 Parsnip 21.8 339 Broccoli 249 1,127 
10 Broccoli 18.9 51 Herbs 248 -   




It has been analyzed more in detail what the rising number of organic vegetable 
growers on a smaller amount of arable land produce in comparison with the statistics 
from 2000. Except for the decline of approximately 300 ha in organic carrot produc-
tion, there does not seem to be a clear picture or significant trends. In general there 
are more growers of cabbage, sugar corn and various kinds of salads, but in the same 
time most cabbage production has declined. Cabbage production therefore must have 
been taken up by more farms, but as a small crop in arable use.  
 
The shift in organic vegetables produced could be a sign of a general trend where 
high quality crops (in money value as well as consumer preferences) are replacing 
low quality crops. But again the time period and changes are to small to give a clear 
indication of possible changes in the organic vegetable production. 
 
In figure 4.5 a couple of vegetables with the largest changes in output have been cho-
sen. Organic carrots are left out of the figure, because the decline is so big compared 
to the other changes in organic vegetable output. Organic carrots dropped in output 
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Figure 4. 5. Selected Organic Vegetables and their change in output 





















Source: Denmark Statistics, 2004. 
 
4.4. Organic Food Sales and Sales Channels in Denmark 
The retail sales of organic food and beverages in 2005 amounted to a total of ap-
proximately 2.3 Billion DKK. (Euro 308 Mio.). In figure 4.7, the composition of the 
organic retail sale is illustrated. As figure 4.6 shows, 50 per cent came from the prod-
uct group milk, cheese and eggs amounting to 1.1 Billion DKK.  Most of the milk, 
cheese and egg sales came from milk products alone (Denmark Statistics, May 2006).  
 
Organic vegetables amounted to a sale of 271 Mio. DKK (Euro 36 Mio.), covering 12 
per cent of all organic retail sales.  
 
Rice, bread, flour, cereals etc. amounted to a sale of 232 Mio. DKK (31 Mio. Euro), 
covering 11 per cent of the total organic retail sale. Meat sales made a total of 194 
Mio. DKK (Euro 26 Mio.), half of it coming from beef and veal. 
 
 
 The Danish Organic Vegetable Chain, FOI 35
 

























In table 4.4 the changes in turnover in retailing has been listed. Vegetables and meat 
are the most significant changes in the areas of growth, but a general increase in sales 
are seen in all areas since 2003. 
 
Table 4.4. Product composition of organic sales in retailing 2003 - 05 (1.000 
DKK.) 
    
 2003 2004 2005 
    
Rice, pasta, bread, flour 231,715 222,079 232,198 
Meat, filling    115, 866 148,226 193,908 
Milk, cheese, egg 1,072,307 1,037,102 1,112,201 
Fat, oils 89,410 94,704 127,163 
Fruit 82,384 98,108 123,524 
Vegetables 230,641 236,623 271,411 
Sugar, chocholate 50,129 49,536 51,978 
Spices 32,246 40,794 55,534 
Coffee, tea, cocoa 58,619 58,086 63,330 
Juice, wine 53,806 55,061 53,925 
    
Total turnover 2,017,123 2,040,319 2,285,173   
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As mentioned above organic vegetables amounted to a total sale of approximately 271 
Mio. DKK (36 Mio. Euro). In figure 4.7 the composition of the vegetable sales in 
more detail is illustrated.  
 
With a sale of 105 Mio DKK. (14 Mio. Euro) organic carrots were by far the largest 
single vegetable sold in Denmark covering 38 per cent of total organic vegetable 
sales. Potatoes covered 13 per cent and onions and tomatoes covering respectively 9 
and 10 per cent. The rest was made up by all kinds of other seasonal vegetables like 
cabbage, leeks, parsnip, salads etc. covering 30 per cent of the total organic vegetable 
sale. 
 















ource: Denmark Statistics, May 2006. 
 
 
In table 4.5 the five categories of organic vegetables are described in terms of the 
amount in tonnes sold and compared with sales in 2005 as well. As one can see or-
ganic carrots have increased with 3,000 tonnes since 2003 - an increase of 36 per 
cent. Potatoes have increased with 859 tonnes, onions with 298 tonnes and tomatoes 
35 tonnes.  
 
 The Danish Organic Vegetable Chain, FOI 37
 
Table 4.5. Organic vegetable sales in tonnes 2003 – 2005 
    
 2003 2004 2005 
    
Tomatoes 445 443 480 
Carrots 8,394 9,365 11,443 
Potatoes 3,833 4,143 4,692 
Onions 1,528 1,544 1,826 
Others 2,754 2,548 2,743 
    
Total  16,954 18,043 21,184   




The total turnover of 2,285 Mio. DKK. in 2005, is according to ‘Denmark Statistics’ 
covering sales through big retailer chains and wholesalers selling to other retailer 
chains. The 2,285 Mio. DKK corresponds to a market share of 3,5 pct for organic 
food and beverages from all retail sales (Denmark Statistics, 2003:65). The statistics 
above does not cover sales through various alternative sales channels.  
 
However, in 2002, Økologisk Landsforening (The National Organic Association), 
made a survey through GfK Consumer Scan 2002, on where consumers purchased 
organic products. In table 4.6 the type of sales channel is listed with its share for or-
ganic products in total turnover as well as its share of the total organic sales in per 
cent. 
 
Table 4.6. Sales channels and their total turnover and sale of organic food ( per 
cent) 2002 
   
 Share of organic 
products in total turnover 
Share of the total organic 
 sale ( per cent) 
   
Big hypermarkets 4,3 7,0 
Discount 4,5 22,5 
Medium hypermarkets 4,8 15,8 
Supermarkets 4,5 30,5 
Mini markets 3,2 4,2 
Alternative sales channels 29,7 12,6 
Others 6,3 7,3 
   
Total 5,0 100   




As table 4.6 shows almost one third of all organic sales in Denmark are sold through 
the supermarkets alone. Discount chains cover almost 23 per cent of all organic sales, 
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and together supermarkets and discount chains cover 53 per cent of all organic sales. 
Retailing covers 80 per cent of all organic sales, whereas alternative sales channels 
cover the last 20 per cent 
 
In figure 4.8 an estimation of total organic sales in DKK has been made on behalf of 
the distribution in percentages and the turn over in retailing according to Denmark 
Statistics (2003:65). The total organic market in 2005 is estimated to almost 2,900 
Million DKK (383 Mio. Euro), on behalf of the 2,285 Mio. DKK from Denmark sta-
tistics regarding the turn over of organic food through retailing, and the estimated 20 
per cent by GFK of organic food sales coming from alternative sales channels + oth-
ers.  
 












Although alternative sales channels “only” covers 12.6 per cent of all organic sales in 
Denmark, they constitute a market share of 29.7 per cent on organic products. One 
alternative sales channel, the successful box-scheme and e-commerce based company 
‘Aarstiderne.com’ (Seasons.com), had a total sale in 2004 at 143 Mio. DKK (Euro 
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19.2 Mio.). Compared with the total organic retail sale Aarstiderne.com would then 
cover 7 per cent of the 12.6 per cent sold through alternative sales channels.  
 
Aarstiderne.com claims that half of the turnover in Aarstiderne.com comes from 
vegetables. This would amount to approximately 70 Mio. DKK. In money terms Aar-
stiderne.com has a share in organic vegetable sales that amounts to 30 per cent of the 
total vegetable sales in retailing which was 237 Mio. DKK in 2004. 
 
If organic vegetables are estimated to have an average market share of 20 per cent 
through alternative sales channels + others (based on 12 per cent in retailing and 30 
per cent through Aarstiderne.com), then the turn over from vegetables through these 
channels would be approximately 114 Mio. DKK (15.3 Mio. Euro) - calculated by 
taken 20 per cent from the estimated 571 Mio. DKK).  
 
Økologisk Landsforening (National Organic Association) views the market share for 
organic products to be 5 per cent of total consumer sales. Økologisk Landsforening 
claims in a consumer analysis that the market share for organic food and beverages 
has been stable at this level since 1999, but with variations in the products coming 
and leaving (www.alt-om-okologi.dk/forbrug/forbrugeranalyse). 
 
Denmark Statistics made a special survey of the organic turnover in retailing in 2003 
(Denmark statistics, 2003:65), which came to around 3.5 per cent of all food and bev-
erage sales. All food and beverage sales were estimated to be 58 Billion DKK. With a 
total turn over in organic food and beverages estimated at 2.9 Billion DKK. (2005) 
the organic share would come to approximately 5 per cent. 
 
Food service is also an important outlet for organic food. In table 4.7 the total turn 
over in food service is illustrated. 
 
Table 4.7. The turnover of organic food through the food service sector 
    
F
 
ood service: Total Organic share Org. vegetables 
   
Public Provisioning 2,2 Billion DKK. 200 – 400 Mio. DKK 24- 48 Mio. DKK. 
Canteens (public and private)   2.8        - unknown Unknown 
Hotel, restaurants, fast food 9.5        - unknown Unknown 
    
Total turn over 14,5 Billion DKK. unknown Unknown   
S
 
ource: Own estimation and Sall & Sall, 2004. 
 
 
40 The Danish Organic Vegetable Chain, FOI 
So far the main markets and drivers for demand of organic food service has been pub-
lic provisioning. The organic share of total public provisioning has been estimated to 
be between 10-20 per cent leaving the organic turnover through public food service 
between 200 and 400 Mio. DKK (Sall & Sall, 2004). If vegetables are estimated to 
have the same market share in percentage in food service as in retailing (12 per cent), 
then organic vegetables would have a turn over in food service between 24 – 48 Mio. 
DKK. 
 
In the food service market firms being purely organic as well as firms with both con-
ventional and organic operate side by side.  
4.5. Organic Food Import and Export to Denmark 
Organic farming in Denmark is not an isolated national production, but consists of 
both a flow in import and export. In 2004 the Danish foreign exchange with organic 
food commodities amounted to a total of 577 Mio DKK (Euro 77 Mio). The import 
amounted to 310. Mio DKK. (Euro 47 Mio), and the export was a bit less, 266. Mio 
DKK (Euro 36 Mio.). 
 
In relation to the total gross output of 2,124 Mio. DKK ‘ab farm’, the organic export 
value accounted for approximately 13 pct (Own calculations based on FOI, 2005 ac-
count statistics for organic farming 2004).  
 
In figure 4.9: ‘Foreign trade with organic food (2004)’, the most important organic 
products respectively being imported and exported to Denmark, are illustrated. The 
largest import share came from ‘fruit and vegetables’, which amounted to 38 per cent 
of the total import in money terms: 118 Mio DKK (Euro 15,8 Mio). Half of it, 59 Mio 
DKK, was coming from vegetables. The import share from vegetables, out of the total 
import of organic foods, amounted then to 19 per cent. 
 
Second largest import share were cereals, followed by coffee, tea, chocolate with re-
spectively 23 and 11 per cent of the total Danish organic import.  
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The largest export share from Danish organic foods was Dairy products including 
eggs, followed by Fruit and vegetables and Cereals. Dairy products and eggs 
amounted to 71,5 Mio DKK (9,6 Mio Euro), Fruits and vegetables 37 Mio. DKK. (5 
Mio Euro), and Cereals approximately 33 Mio DKK (4.4 Mio Euro). Within the cate-
gory of Fruit and vegetables the value of exports from vegetables alone amounted to 
19 Mio DKK, and consisted of both frozen and fresh vegetables. The export value 
from vegetables, out of the total organic food export, amounted to 7 per cent. 
 
In figure 4.10 and figure 4.11 the various country groups, from where Denmark re-
spectively imports organic products from and exports to, is illustrated.  
 
In 2004 the EU-25 contributed with 87 per cent of the total organic import to Den-
mark. The organic food import though is concentrated on a very few countries. Three 
countries, Germany, Holland and Italy alone, contributed with 62 pct of the total or-
ganic import. Ten per cent came from North- and South America, and the last 3 per 
cent from Asia, Africa and Oceania. 
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Source: Denmark Statistics, November 2005. 
 
 
The countries receiving Danish organic food exports are even more concentrated. As 
illustrated in figure 4.11, 88 per cent of the export goes to EU-25 countries alone, and 
three countries, Great Britain, Sweden and Germany, accounts for 78 per cent of the 
total Danish organic export. Two per cent was exported to North- and South America, 
Asia and Oceania 1 per cent and ‘other countries’ accounted for the last 9 per cent 
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In figure 4.12 the turnover from all organic vegetables in 2004 in relation to import, 
national sales as well as export are illustrated. The share of organic vegetables in per-
centage as well as in money value is arranged to compare with the value of all organic 
food. Figure 4.12 is an overview of the many different data already mentioned in 
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5. Development in Producer – Retailer relations 
Case studies: Organic carrots and Iceberg salad 
Analyzing the changes taken place in the organic vegetable production, focus was 
made in depth on the governance structures between producers and retailers. Two 
commodities where chosen and followed along the supply chain: Organic carrots and 
Iceberg salad.  
 
The two commodities were chosen because   
 
1. to test if differences in durability of vegetables (asset specificity) would have 
any impact on the governance structure and transactions between ‘producer – 
retailer’ to avoid various ’hold up’ situations concerning vegetables with a 
short durability  
 
2. carrots and salads were the most sold organic vegetables each in relation to 
having respectively a long and short durability 
 
Getting sufficient quantitative market as well as data on iceberg salad or salads in 
general has proven difficult, and therefore the ability to compare or verify all of the 
obtained qualitative data from the producer-retailer network has not been possible re-
garding this commodity. 
5.1. Primary production base 
In chapter 4.3 a general overview of the production base for all organic vegetables 
was introduced illustrated by its 160 farms covering 1,054 hectare. In this chapter the 
specific data for organic carrots and iceberg salad will be introduced. 
 
Table 5.1 illustrates the changes taken place from 2000 to 2003 in the organic carrot 
and iceberg salad production compared to changes in the conventional production.  
 
Among organic carrots the arable land has bee reduced with 320 ha – falling from 538 
ha to 218 ha - and the production output has declined with 10,154 tonnes – from 
19,190 to 9,036. The number of farms has declined from 73 to 64. Compared to con-
ventional carrot production the number of farms has increased with 16 farms from 
141 to 157 and the arable land has risen with 177 ha – from 770 ha to 947 ha. Produc-
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tion output has risen from 29,974 tonnes to 43,036 tonnes – an increase of 47 per 
cent. 
 
Organic Iceberg salad seems to be very stable in terms of number of farms and output 
during the period 2000 to 2003. Conventional Iceberg producers have fallen from 28 
to 24, but the arable land is the same. 
 
However, the organic vegetable producers within carrots and iceberg salad were dur-
ing the qualitative interviews of the opinion, that the official statistics on vegetable 
production in 2000 were not all correct. Denmark statistics have confirmed this, and 
in their statistics for 2003 (Denmark Statistics, 2004: 2) written that some producers 
with conventional production have been included as organic. The data on vegetable 
production for 2003 are according to the producers’ representative. They also state 
that there has been a decline in farmers producing organic carrot, and that the sector is 
experiencing a concentration of production on fewer but larger farms. 
 
Table 5.1. Development in organic and conventional carrot and iceberg produc-
tion 2003 
         
 No. of farms No. of ha Prod. output (tonnes)  Ha per farm 
         
 2000 2003 2000 2003 2000 2003 2000 2003 
         
Org. carrot 73 64 538 218 19,190   9,036 35.7 41.5 
Conv. carrot 141 157 770 947 29,974 43,914 39 46.4 
Org. Iceb. salad 14 13 33 32 532 531 16.1 16.6 
Conv. Iceb. salad 28 24 177 177 4,651 4,246 26 24   




From Denmark Statistics a special survey on the import and export of organic carrots 
and iceberg salads was requested for this report. However, Iceberg salad was too 
small a number to gather information on, but all organic salads could be obtained, and 
are therefore shown to give a picture of the import/export size. 
 
In figure 5.1 the import/export in tonnes are illustrated. The import of organic carrots 
was 715 tonnes. In relation to the total production of 9,036, the import share was 8 
per cent. There was a small export of 63 tonne. Salads had an import share of 50 ton-
nes, and just 3,7 tonnes of export. 
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In figure 5.2 the import/export share in DKK (Mio) is illustrated. The organic carrot 
import amounted to 2,3 Mio. DKK Compared to the total organic vegetable import of 
28,127 Mio. DKK, the organic carrot import share accounted for 8 per cent. 
 
These data from Denmark Statistics did not correspond with the qualitative informa-
tion obtained from the producers. The producers stated an import twice as much, and 
an export almost 13 times more than the official statistics claim. Pointing out these 
discrepancies to Denmark Statistics they have informed that the producers own state-
ments should be followed, and that they will look into their future statistical data col-
lection on organic import/export. 
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Source: Denmark Statistics 2005 (special delivery). 
 
5.2. Packaging – the producer node of bargain power 
In terms of bargain power key players among organic vegetable producers are not 
only related to their size of production, but also their ability of controlling the packag-
ing and distribution of other vegetables in general. The owner(s) of the packaging 
node are often a major producer of one or a few vegetables with a supply of other 
vegetables from other producers to keep costs of labour and machinery in the packag-
ing down. Therefore, if analyses are on power relations in a food chain, the traditional 
approach of focusing on a specific vegetable and following it along the chain is not 
sufficient and could even be misleading.  
 
The point of departure for power analysis therefore focused on the governance struc-
ture between the node of vegetable packaging and the buyers. Since retailers are the 
main buyers of organic vegetables, and the producers themselves claimed that power 
in transactions was exercised by the retailers using various control mechanisms to 
carry it out, analysis went into depth with the development in producer-retailer rela-
tions. 
 
Among organic carrots producers three major suppliers out of 64 (in 2003) control the 
node of packaging. They are Dan Organic Ltd., Søris I/S and Tange market garden 
Ltd. The three are also major packagers and distributors of other organic vegetables 
like onions, potatoes etc. purchased in from other producers. 
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Organic iceberg salad 
                      Producer/distributor: 
  
Dan Organic Ltd.: 
A distributor of 60 suppliers (42 are members) 
 
Production flow/year: 
  3,500 t. consumer carrots 
  1,800 t. industry carrots 
 
Import: 350- 400 t. consumer carrots 
Export: 800 t. consumer carrots 
             1,800 t. industry carrots 
 
Søris I/S: 
Farm: 100 ha. (10 ha own carrot production) 
 
Production flow: 3,500 t. consumer carrots 
 
Import: 1,000 t. consumer carrots 
 
Tange market garden Ltd.: 
Farm: 375 ha mostly rented land.  
(95 ha carrots) 
 
Production flow/year: 
   3.500 t. consumer carrots 
 
Export: 300 t. consumer carrots 
 
Marienlyst market garden Ltd: 
Market garden: 30-40 ha  + rents land 
70 ha own carrot production 
 
Production flow/year: 
  2,500 t. consumer carrots 
 
Import: 150 t. consumer carrots 
 
Aarstiderne.com (E-trading company) 
Sales flow: 420 t. consumer carrots 
Import: 60 t. consumer carrots 
 
Marienlyst market garden Ltd: 
Market garden: 30-40 ha + rents land  
8 ha iceberg salad production 
 
Production flow/year:  
  150,000 heads 
 
Skytte, Lars  
Market garden: 17 ha (12 ha iceberg salad) 
 
Production flow/year:  
  200,000 heads 
 
Øko-One Aps 
Owner rents land: 22 ha 
(8 ha iceberg salad production) 
 
Production flow/year: 
 150,000 heads 
 
Aarstiderne.com 
Production/Sales flow: 600,000 heads 
Import: 300,000heads 
Total number of producers in 2003 
  
64 13   




In iceberg salad a similar number of producers can be considered major distributors to 
the retailers, and thereby in control of contracting with the retailers. The three pro-
ducers (out of 13 in 2003) are Marienlyst market garden, Lars Skytte and ‘Øko-One’ 
by Michael Balle.   
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The E-trading company Aarstiderne.com is supplied partly by the producers in the 
node of packaging and from some farms national and internationally. The packagers 
and most of the carrot/iceberg salad producers supplying Aarstiderne were in general 
satisfied with the contracting terms and the governance structure based on a contract 
stating a fixed price and expected output for the season. However, this way of con-
tracting is also possible due to the customer policy of Aarstiderne, where several of 
the boxes have a fixed portion of vegetables supplied. The customers do not know en-
tirely what the box contains, but accept this as a surprise or a service in helping to try 
out new vegetables. 
 
During the qualitative interviews some of the suppliers to Aarstiderne were express-
ing resentment to the changing conditions on how contracts were negotiated, claiming 
that a price pressure similar to the ones coming from the retailers were starting to be 
implemented. 
 
In table 5.3 the four major producers/distributors in organic carrots and iceberg salad 
are listed with their total production flow, including the size of import/export in terms 
of tonnes, and compared to the data from Denmark Statistics (2003 & 2005). The 
numbers from the producers are based on their own statements for 2005.  
 
In relation to consumer carrots the total production flow was by the producers esti-
mated to be 13,000 tonnes. Within the total production flow 1,200 tonnes were im-
ported, making total production of consumer carrots in Denmark 11,800 tonnes. From 
the 11,800 1,100 were exported leaving 10,700 tonnes for sales in Denmark. Official 
sales on organic carrots through retailers in 2005 (leaving out alternative sales chan-
nels) were 9,769 tonnes. In this respect producer claims and official statistics corre-
sponded fairly close. 
 
However the official import/export data deviated a lot from the producers own claims. 
As illustrated in table and table 5.2 the national production of organic carrots accord-
ing to Denmark Statistics (2003) was 9,036 t. plus an import of 715 t. making the total 
official production flow 9,751 tonnes. The official import quota of 715 tonnes was 
only 65 per cent of what the producers claimed, which amounted to 1,200 t. The offi-
cial data on exports of organic carrots was 63 tonnes, whereas the producers claimed 
they exported 1,100 tonnes. As mentioned before Denmark Statistics has been noti-
fied this deviation on the official data of organic carrot import/export and producer 
claims. One has to be aware though that the official data is from 2003, but the qualita-
tive interviews have been made in 2004 and 2005. The import/export flow can in the 
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same time vary a lot from one year to the other in small market such as the organic 
market. 
 
Table 5.3. Producer claims and official statistics on production, imports and ex-
ports – organic carrots and iceberg salad 
     
 Production (tonnes) Import (t) Export (t) 
     
 
 
Carrots Iceberg salad Carrots Carrots 
    
Denmark Statistics 9,036 531 715 63 
Producer claims 10,700 500 1,200 1,100   
 
 
In relation to iceberg salad the four major suppliers claimed they had a production of 
1,1 Mio. salad heads. Two salad heads amount to approximately one kilogram, mak-
ing the total production of iceberg salads 575 tonnes. Denmark Statistics had an offi-
cial production output of 531 tonnes, which is also very close to producer claims. 
 
However it is important to be aware of the term ‘production flow’ running through the 
link of packaging, because these links have an extended supply network between each 
other helping out when one of them have an order they cannot fulfil sufficiently. The 
amount of carrots can therefore appear two times at two different packagers. 
5.3. Governance structure in Producer – Retailer transactions 
Since year 2000 the way ‘producer – retailer’ transactions have been conducted has 
changed dramatically. The changes have been listed in table 5.4. 
 
Until 2000, when demand for organic products was increasing rapidly in a market of 
undersupply, transactions were in general planned and coordinated between a retailer 
and a producer organization with mutual bindings concerning terms of production 
output, determination of price before season start.  
 
After 2000, when markets for organic products in general became more saturated, the 
‘producer – retailer’ transactions have been shaped by a process moving towards a 
more competitive market driven environment, where demand-supply and asymmetric 
bargain power in favour of the retailers determines the price.  
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Table 5.4. Retailer-producer transactions before and after year 2000 
   
 Before 2000 After  2000 
   
Retailer obligations on production output Yes No 
Producer start price negotiated before season start Yes No 
Producer prices during season decided according to demand and supply Yes Yes 
Various slotting fees for access to retailer space No Yes   




The way transactions take place starts with the retailers, more specific a procurement 
officer in the buyer organization, who negotiates with producers individually before 
the start of the season about their expected production budget in combination with the 
retailer’s sales budget. Some producers claim that they do not get any information 
about the retailers’ expectations on sale. 
 
In general the producers claim that there are no written bindings or terms concerning 
retailer obligations buying the production output. Prices are determined during the 
season on a weekly basis based on demand and supply, and the retailers are free to 
buy from whom they want. 
 
Since 2000 various slotting fees and other control mechanisms for selling through re-
tailers have been institutionalized, and thereby moving the cost and risk-burden of 
selling organic vegetables more and more on to the producers themselves.  
 
The qualitative interviews of the organic vegetable producers indicate an increasing 
bargain power at the retailer node especially through the various and variable control 
mechanisms concerning marketing fees, obligation fees for renting specific retailer 
packaging systems, time of return payment from deliverance, opening fees for having 
access to new retail stores, all of which the producers have to pay. In table 5.5 the 
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Table 5.5. Retailer control mechanisms on organic vegetable suppliers 
   
 2003 Future retail proposals 
   
Period of credit 21 days 45 - 90 days 
Specific marketing fee per. sold unit (D.kr.) 0,10 No information 
A general marketing fee 2-3  per cent 5  per cent 
Deposit for renting retailer boxes 30 D.kr. No information  
Rent of using packing boxes 3.80 D.kr. per box No information 
Opening fee No information 2,500 D.kr 
Written contract None Yes 
Producer covering losses First 6 days No information   




Concerning the period of credit, the interviews with the organic vegetable producers 
revealed that retailers have proposed to prolong the time of return on payments from 
originally 21 days to 45 days. One producer even claimed that they are pushing for 90 
days. In other words, the retailers are reducing the cost of capital for themselves, but 
increasing it for the producers.  
 
The consequences of extending the period of credit will first of all put a pressure on 
small farmers, who are often a major group in organic farming. Secondly, the turn 
over period of vegetables delivered and sold in supermarkets is usually under a week, 
so the discrepancy between sold at retailer and retailers paying their suppliers will 
grow immensely.  
 
The ‘specific marketing fee’ which the farmer pays per unit sold at the retailer is a re-
placement for a previous policy, where the producers had to accept a random reduc-
tion in price if the retailers had planned a certain campaign involving organic vegeta-
bles. In this way the producers have a kind of control over their contribution to sales 
campaigns, and what the retailers actually carry through. 
 
The ‘general marketing fee’ is a fee the producers have no control of what it goes for. 
Before it was a mutual agreement on helping marketing organic vegetables, but the 
producers pushed forward for getting a more specific marketing fee to control pay-
ments and retailer marketing efforts. In some ways it would be more correct to say 
that the marketing fee has become a ‘space fee’ the retailers collect for the producers 
to use space in the retailer stores. The retailers have proposed to raise the marketing 
fee from the previously 2-3 per cent to 5 per cent. 
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Deposit on packing boxes is a deposit the producers have to pay the retailers for rent-
ing their specific packing boxes. The deposit is paid back when boxes are returned to 
the retailers. 
 
On top of that the producers also have to pay a Renting fee per packing box to cover 
depreciations of the boxes plus the obligation of the retailers to wash them. 
 
Some of the large producers interviewed claim that in relation to sales agreements on 
organic exports the discount chain ‘Netto’ charges an opening fee from the producers 
for getting the advantages of access to more space in new stores the chain is opening 
abroad. Discount chains usually have between 1,200 and 1,400 commodities, so if this 
is a fee that is collected from each supplier of 1,400 commodities it amounts to 3,5 
Mio DKK collected just to open a store. However, only very few of the producers 
have been presented for an opening fee. 
 
A Written contract is being proposed more and more heavily from the retailers on the 
producers. They have so far rejected to sign it many of them claiming that the de-
mands are outrages like paying a fine of 10,000 DKK if deliverables are not on time. 
However, the increasing push for written contracts in the governance structure be-
tween retailers and organic vegetable producers has to be seen in relation to the grow-
ing vertical integration and internationalization of the buyer organizations of the re-
tailers. The nearness between national buyers and producers are diminishing, and so 
written contracts are becoming the norm to secure supplies.  
 
The organic vegetable producers are in this regard part of trend for written contracts 
seen in other countries as well (Glaser et al., 2001)  
 
Producers covering losses is for salad producers 6 days. That means if the salads start 
to rotten within 6 days the producer covers the loss. The producers are here left with a 
lot of asymmetric information concerning their products regarding handling at the re-
tailer distribution center, distribution itself to display in the shops. If salads are not 
sold because the retailer claims they were starting to rot, the producers are left with 
only trust on this type of governance structure in transactions. 
 
The qualitative interviews with the producers reveal that not only has the producer-
retailer regime changed since 2000 from a market with certain obligations resting on 
the shoulders of the retailers concerning sales, to a pure market driven price setting. 
The retailers’ have also created a ‘tool box’ for various ways to control and increase 
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their bargain power towards the suppliers, and according to the organic vegetable 
farmers, the pressure is increasing.  
 
Parallel with the tool box, an increasing vertical integration in decision making 
among retailers is also taking place.  
 
For example the buyer organizations among the three biggest players in Denmark, 
‘Coop Denmark’, ‘Dansk Supermarked’ and ‘SuperGros’, have all become more ver-
tically integrated. In relation to Coop Denmark the buyer organization within food has 
transformed into a buyer organization for ‘Coop Nordic Food’ organized along differ-
ent food categories (i.e. fruit and vegetables). In this respect a common statement 
from the organic vegetable producers being interviewed was, that previously they 
could negotiate personally with the procurement officer responsible for purchasing 
their crop or group of crops. But now the producers claim that the procurement offi-
cers themselves have little or no influence on the terms of transactions. It is “some-
body higher up in the system where decisions have been made”, the producers are 
told. 
 
‘Netto’, the discount chain under ‘Dansk Supermarked’, which is a major outlet for 
organic products, has previously negotiated sales and terms of contracting directly 
with the producers. From January 2005 contracts, terms of distribution, have to be ne-
gotiated with ‘Dansk Supermarked Indkøb’ (Dansk Supermarked buyer organization).  
 
To combat this growing trans-national concentration of buyer power and vertical re-
straints, some of the organic producers predicted that their countermoves would be to 
buy or ally themselves with other organic farmers in Germany as well as in the Nor-
dic countries. In this way they would still be in control of the node of packaging and 
distributing in relation to the buyer organisations of the retailers operating on a Scan-
dinavian market. In the same time they would also be able to handle large amounts as 
well as a greater product variety, offering retailers economies of scale and scope. 
5.4. Declining terms of trade for organic producers. 
According to the theories applied above normal profits in the organic market will only 
be temporarily. Obtaining data though on profits from a group of individual farmers 
are difficult if not impossible, because of its sensitivity on individual performance. 
However, what is possible to obtain are data on prices and costs, development in pro-
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duction output as well as the amount of farms and their production size. In this way 
one can indirectly claim how profits over time will be running.  
 
By collecting data on costs on production factors as well as farm gate prices and turn-
ing them into an index calculation, one can show the terms of trade over time indicat-
ing how the profits of the vegetable producers have developed. By comparing the de-
velopment in terms of trade among organic and conventional producers, the hypothe-
sis, claiming that the above-normal profits of organic farmers is only temporary, 
could be tested. 
 
Official statistical data collected yearly on the cost structure of organic farmers are 
very few and in relation to vegetables almost absent. Concerning organic carrots a 
cost structure was made in relation to a FOI report in 2001 analyzing the economic 
consequences of reducing pesticides in Danish horticulture (Ørum & Christensen, 
2001). The Danish Agricultural Advisory Service recommended using these calcula-
tions. For salads none is made, and it was decided to leave them out from the calcula-
tions concerning terms of trade in this report. 
 
In table 5.6 the cost structure on organic and conventional carrots is illustrated (DKK) 
(Ørum & Christensen, 2001): 
 
Table 5.6. Cost structure on organic and conventional carrots (DKK) 
   
 Conventional Organic 
   
Yield 50 tonnes/ha 35 tonnes/ha 
 
Seed 13,200  14,000 
Fertilizer/manure 1,790 1,000 
Pesticides 1,796 0 
Energy 1,000 2,200 
Machine pool 3,000 5,600 
Labour 30,800 32,750 
   
Production factors total (DKK) 51,787 55,550   




From the cost structure one can see that the cost of pesticides in conventional carrot 
production is traded off with higher cost on labour, machinery and energy in weed 
treatment in organic carrot production 
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The distribution of the various production factors were then transformed into weights 
turning the production costs into an index using the statistic data base of FOI on agri-
cultural prices to calculate the development on these production factors from 1998 to 
2004. 
 
The average prices ‘ab farm’ on organic and conventional carrots from 1998 to 2004 
were correspondingly transformed into an index, so the terms of trade between or-
ganic and conventional carrots could be compared. 
 
In table 5.7 the organic prices ‘ab farm’ have been listed together with the conven-
tional carrot prices, and the organic premium in percentage has been calculated. 
 
Table 5.7. Average prices ‘ab farm’ on organic and conventional carrots from 
1998 to 2004 
        
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
        
Conventional 2.15 2.42 2.32 2.60 2.66 2.53 2.61 
Organic 3.59 3.41 3.26 3.68 4.41 3.97 3.79 
Organic premium in percentage 67 41 41 42 66 57 45   




In figure 5.3 the production factors and yearly average producer prices of organic car-
rots is illustrated as an index calculations starting with hundred in 1998. What figure 
5.3 shows is that from 1998 to 2001 the terms of trade are negative. Then from 2001 
to 2002 terms of trade are in favour of the producers, but after that, terms of trade are 
again reduced. Negative terms of trade do not mean that the farmers can not make a 
profit. It only tells that the sector as an average on this commodity will have negative 
terms of trade. Individual farmers can have a cost structure which enables them to 
have a positive term of trade. What is also typical in vegetable production is that 
farmers often produce several vegetables, and therefore can alleviate a decline in 
prices in one commodity, yet still secure an overall income through the other vegeta-
bles produced and sold. 
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Source: Own calculations 
 
 
When compared to the terms of trade for conventional farmers in figure 5.4 two 
things leap in the eye. First, the price index for organic carrots shows much more 
fluctuations indicating it is a market more sensitive to demand and supply, due to its 
small market size and output fluctuations. Secondly, the terms of trade for the con-
ventional farmers have from the whole period of 1998 to 2004 been positive. The fig-
ure though indicates that the terms of trade could become negative in the years ahead 
by the closing gap between the price index and production factor index. 
 
The positive terms of trade for the conventional carrot farmers could in the same time 
be a strong indication of why there has been in decline in organic carrot producers 
from 2000 to 2003 as stated by the organic producers in chapter 5.1. However, the of-
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Source: Own calculations 
5.5. Contraction between organic and conventional carrot prices 
The possibility for the organic farmers to obtain a price premium because of having 
ownership to organic commodities as a critical resource with high utility and rela-
tively scarcity would accordingly to the theory on property rights and the treadmill 
theory only be temporary, and therefore a contraction between organic and conven-
tional prices should be expected. 
 
These assumptions are stated in hypothesis number one claiming that above normal 
profits in organic farming will be temporary for producers operating in open competi-
tive markets. 
 
To analyze and compare the development in terms of trade the development in con-
sumer prices for carrots were obtained and analyzed. The Food and Resource Eco-
nomic Institute is in possession of monthly retailer prices for carrots in the period 
from 1997 to 2000 inclusive, which are also allowed to be publicised. These data have 
been converted into real prices, and analyzed to evaluate the price trend in organic 
and conventional carrot respectively for the discount market and the supermarkets. 
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In the following the 4 year price development of organic and conventional carrot 
prices are illustrated respectively between two competing discount stores and super-
markets. 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the price development between two competing discount chains. The 
fluctuations of prices are following the seasonal fluctuation with a low price during 
winter, increasing in spring until the supply of fresh home-market produce reaches a 
peak typically from May to July. Then prices start to fall, reaching a price minimum 
in November/December. 
 
The upper lines illustrate the price development of organic carrots between two com-
peting discount stores. The lower line illustrates the price development for conven-
tional carrots in the same stores. For the organic carrots there is a clear downward 
trend in consumer prices whereas it seems stable for the conventional carrots indicat-
ing a contraction of prices.  
 
Figure 5.5. Two competing discount chains and their real monthly prices from 
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In figure 5.6. the 4 year price development between two competing supermarket 
chains are illustrated. 
 
Figure 5.6 shows similarly to the discount stores a decline and contraction of organic 
carrot prices towards conventional prices. Secondly, there is a greater fluctuation in 
the supermarket prices especially among the organic carrots. From the qualitative in-
terviews this was explained by the procurement officers that organic products have 
occasionally been used as a way to profile the supermarket using price differentiation 
in shorter periods. Since supermarkets typically have 10-15 organic vegetable prod-
ucts to offer in contrast to the discount chains they can more easily differentiate on 
organic vegetable prices. The discount chains usually only have two organic vegeta-
bles: carrots and onions (potatoes as well, but they are not registered as a vegetable). 
The downward trend of organic carrots was explained by the procurement officers in 
the supermarkets as a consequence partly of the discount chains moving into the or-
ganic segment and the producers have become better and more secure in their produc-
tion and supply. 
 
The conventional carrot prices in the supermarkets showed no significant changes ei-
ther during the 4 year period. 
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Figure 5.6. Two competing supermarket chains and their real prices on organic 



























For the price trend analysis a regression model was formulated to test if the organic 
and conventional carrot prices were contracting as indicated by the figures. In order to 
valuate the slope of the lines and if they were statistical significant the following re-
gression model was formulated as  
 
Price  =  f (supermarket, product type, time, time x product type) + ε 
 
Where: 
Price is a monthly price from 1997 – 2000;  
Supermarkets are supermarket 1 supermarket 2 
Product types are organic and conventional carrots 
Time is monthly time is 1.2…48 months 
The error term is represented by ε, ~ N (0, σ2) 
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In this specification ‘time x product type’ (slope) is of interest, since it catches the dif-
ference in the price trend for organic and conventional carrots. 
 
A similar specification has been made for the discount market. 
 
The results are illustrated by table 5.7 
 
Tabel 5.7. Development on consumer prices respectively for organic and con-
ventional carrots in competing supermarkets as well as discount 
stores 
         
   DISCOUNT SUPERMARKET 
         
 Estimate SE T-value Signifi-
cance 
level 
Estimate SE T-value Signifi-
cance 
level 
         
Intercept 5,1549 0,3169 16,27 *** 7,9045 0,3353 23,57 ** 
Shop 1 0,0668 0,2142 0,31  NS 0,8059 0,2267 3,55 *** 
Organic 6,13379 0,4217 14,55 *** 4,9552 0,4463 11,10 *** 
Time 0,0028 0,0109 0,26 NS 0,0024 0,0116 0,21 NS 
Org x time -0,058 0,0155 -3,74 *** -0,0519 00164 -3,16 **   
*** =  (P< 0,001)     NS = Not significant 
 ** =  (P< 0,01) SE = Standard Even of Means 
 
Source: Own calculation.  
 
 
Compared to the price development in conventional carrots there has been a clear 
contraction between organic and conventional carrot prices, with a significant decline 
on organic carrots. This is indicated by the result of -0,058 in org x time in the dis-
count shops illustrating the slope value for organic carrots which is a decline of ap-
proximately 0.06 DKK pr. Month pr. Kg in the four period.  
 
For conventional carrots there are no significant (NS) changes on prices during the 4 
year period of 1997-2000, indicated by the result of 0,0028 in Time (compared to 
conventional), which is close to zero. Similar results are found among the supermar-
kets. 
 
These results confirm the ones found on the terms of trade for respectively organic 
and conventional carrot producers, being mostly negative for the organic carrot pro-
ducers and positive for the conventional. 
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5.6. Retailers’ gross profit and their cost of distributing organic. 
In relation to the weekly retail prices on carrots from 1997 to 2000 inclusive, it was 
tried to collect the farm gate prices on organic carrots on a weekly or monthly basis to 
see if the retailers where behaving discriminatory towards producer prices and 
thereby obtaining any excessive profits. This has unfortunately not been possible 
since most farmers throw away there accounts after five years. The tax law in Den-
mark requires that the owner of an enterprise only has to store their accounts up to 
five years. 
 
The purpose of this manoeuvre was to check producer claims stating that supermar-
kets and discount chains, in their bargains and transactions with producers, operate 
with fixed gross profit margins in relation to expected consumer prices. It would then 
have been possible to document the producer claims of a fixed gross profit margin on 
organic vegetables in discount chains at 25 per cent and in supermarkets around 40 
per cent. The fixed gross profit margins of 25 and 40 per cent have neither been con-
firmed nor dismissed by the procurement officers interviewed 
 
Instead an approximation has been made using average farm prices and average con-
sumer prices.  
 
The prices ‘ab packaging’ in the period of 1997 – 2000 had been fluctuating from a 
minimum of three DKK to a maximum of six DKK. Typically a minimum price in 
November/December reaching a maximum from May to July. 
 
By installing the ‘ab packaging’ minimum and maximum price at the top and the bot-
tom of the retail prices during 1997 – 2000, and compared it with the producer prices 
‘ab farm’, the gross profit of respectively the discount stores and supermarkets have 
been calculated.  
 
In table 5.8 an average consumer price in supermarkets for organic carrots at 12.08 
DKK pr. kg. have been installed using the average consumer price during the four 
year period. From the 12.08 DKK/Kg a value added tax of 25 per cent has been de-
ducted giving a price of 9.66 DKK/Kg. Average producer price ab farm have been 
calculated from FOI statistics, and packing charges of 1.75 DKK pr Kg have been 
given by the packagers. 
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Gross profits for supermarkets have then been calculated to be 46 per cent leaving a 
gross profit at 4.49 DKK/Kg and a sales price ‘ab packaging’ at 5.17 DKK/Kg.  
 
A similar calculation has been made for the discount shops leaving a gross profit mar-
gin at 32 per cent.  
 
Even though using one average price on carrots for the whole four year period the 
gross profit estimates are fairly close to producer claims on retailer profits on organic 
vegetables in general. 
 
Table 5.8. Estimated calculation on gross profits in retailing 
   
 Supermarkets Discount chains 
   
Average organic consumer price pr. kg 12.8   D.kr.  9.52 -  D.kr 
Value added tax (25 per cent) 2.42 1.90 
   
 9.66  7.62 
   
Gross profit       4.49   (46  per 
cent) 
2.45   (32  per 
cent) 
   
Sales price ab packaging 5.17 5.17 
Packaging charges 1.75 1.75 
   
Average price pr. kg ab farm 3.42 3.42   
 
 
In relation to the contraction between organic and conventional prices (in carrots) in 
retailing, it was examined if there were any particularly costs ‘ab packaging’ in han-
dling and distributing organic products. 
 
From the network and nodes of transactions illustrated in chapter 4.3, it was shown, 
that the links from ‘farm to fork’ in handling fresh produce like vegetables, are very 
short. There are only two nodes where cost of handling organic products between 
packagers and retailers could be appropriated: 
 
- The retail distribution center 
- The retail outlet store 
  
The retail distribution center owned by Coop in Brøndby (Zealand) was in this case 
visited and the procurement officer handling vegetables there was interviewed. At the 
distribution center there was no extra handling or special places for storage of organic 
products.  
 
 The Danish Organic Vegetable Chain, FOI 67
The only extra cost in relation to handling and distributing organic products was 
transaction cost concerning documentation and tracebility towards public control. The 
distribution center had to keep track of every single organic parcel, and be able to 
track whether it had been sold, where too, or if it had been registered as a loss. In con-
trast to conventional products parcels disappeared or lost could just be registered as a 
loss.  
 
In the retail shops various procurement officers in charge of vegetables and fruits 
have been interviewed and asked if there were any particular cost in handling organic 
products. The extra cost of handling organic products for the retailer outlets were in 
general higher losses concerning durability due to lower shelf flow. In this regard, if 
the retail managers wanted to have a broader selection of organic products, they 
would endure higher risk in handling products with lower flows. This risk would in 
the same time increase, because the individual outlets were forced to buy a certain 
amount of parcels to cover the costs of transportation, and hence they would have or-
ganic products in surplus that would not be sold or simply stay too long on the shelf.  
 
The problem of slow flows and thereby higher costs for the outlets handling organic 
products was typically found in organic fruits. This was contrary to organic vegeta-
bles which 
 
in relation to organic carrots and organic salads problems of durability and flow 
were no different from the conventional ones. 
 
The extra costs of handling and distributing organic products ‘ab packaging’ is com-
piled in table 5.9 
 
Table 5.9. Extra costs handling organic products ab packaging 
  
Retail distribution center Retail outlet 
  
 
Transaction costs in relation to securing transpar-
ency towards public control. 
Slower flow (often fruits)compared to conventional 
products affecting durability and causes higher 
costs in lost sales 
 
Outlets are forced to buy a certain amount of par-
cels to cover transportation costs – even if they 
know they cannot sell all of them. 
 
The retailer outlet is therefore confronted with the 
dilemma of wanting to have a broad selection of 
organic products, but increases the risk of handling 
products not all being sold (higher costs).  
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The results from examining the cost structure from handling organic products ‘ab 
packaging’ shows also the dilemma of distributing fresh foods to small markets like 
organic vegetables through retailing, demanding a certain size and flow to be cost ef-
ficient. Furthermore the results from this investigation perhaps also explains why es-
pecially organic vegetables have such a high percentage of its market sale through al-
ternative distribution channels, because sales can be more planned through various 
schemes of committing consumers. 
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6. Space for Future Producer Opportunities 
6.1. Development in Retailing 
Part of this research project was to propose marketing strategies to promote further 
growth opportunities for the organic vegetable sector. By analyzing power relations 
along the supply chain, and combine it with qualitative interviews of key players 
along the vegetable supply chain the purpose was to discover new spaces for producer 
actions. 
 
For analyzing the development in retailing, the frame of reference and point of depar-
ture, was to look at the retail structure.  
 
By retail structure means (Grunert, K. 1996): 
 
- type of stores 
- store concepts 
- number of outlets per store type 
- market share per store type 
- types of ownership/organization 
- groups/alliances/partnerships 
- location per store type 
 
The retail structure is again a result of the interplay/interaction and actual values of 
variables within four main categories of determinants: consumers, technology, retail-
ers and regulations. This is illustrated in figure 6.1, where changes in retail structure 
will occur when one or more variable within one or more of the categories change. 
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From various literature analyzing the retail structure decline and concentration was 
during the 1980’s up to mid-nineties the overall picture in most European countries 
(Grünert, 1996). However, looking at the Danish retail scene from 1995 to 2005, an 
opposite trend has been emerging concerning the number of outlets (Stockmann-
Gruppen, 2004).  
 
In figure 6.2 the total number of outlets since 1995 has actually been increasing 
steadily. This increase though has mainly been carried out by a rapid growth in the 
number of discount outlets rising from 16 in 1980 to 1,055 in 2005. The number of 
supermarket has like in other European countries declined during the 1980’s and up to 
mid 1990’s, but has since 2000 risen slow but steadily.  
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Analyzing more specifically the type of stores within supermarkets and discount 
shops, changes and concentration have clearly been emerging on specific store sizes.  
As table 6.1 illustrates there has been a strong decline in the category of small super-
markets of 0-199 m2, 200-299 m2 and 300-399 m2 as well as the medium sized su-
permarket in the category of 600-799 m2. However, supermarkets competing with the 
discount stores in terms of size ranging from 400-599 m2, and the large supermarkets 
in the category of 800 m2 and more, are the ones that have been showing growth in 
the ten-year period from 1995 – 2005. The two categories in supermarkets showing 
growth covered in 1995 61 per cent of all supermarkets, and in 2005 they covered 77 
per cent of all supermarkets.  
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Table 6.1. Development in shop size among discount and supermarkets (1995-
2005) 
     
Shopsize m2 No. of  Discount stores No. of Supermarkets 
     
 1995 2005 1995 2005 
     
0-199 1 0 12 7 
200-299 81 22 42 11 
300-399 267 145 78 5 
400-599 273 807 232 300 
600-799 34 81 217 189 
800- > 0 0 306 393 
     
Total 656 1.055 887 905 
     
Total m2 266,864 510,371 644,666 755,013 
     
m2/shop 407 484 727 834   




When analyzing the changes and development within the discount stores, the picture 
shows that they started out as smaller shops competing with small independent retail-
ers and shop owners. Today, 77 per cent of the discount stores are dominated by the 
shop size ranging from 400-599 m2, where in 1995 they accounted for only 42 per 
cent. From table 6.1 there are also clear observations that the discount stores are mov-
ing into the medium sized shops of 600-799 m2, and over time could out-compete the 
supermarkets within this shop range.  
 
The large increase in the number of discount stores, and the relative decline in super-
markets have also affected the market share in relation to their turnover. 
 
In figure 6.3 one can see that the supermarkets have lost their share of the market in 
turnover during 1995 to 2005 declining from 76 per cent to 67 per cent Discount 
stores on the other hand are the clear winners rising in terms of turnover from ap-
proximately 20 per cent in 1995 to 27 cent in 2005. These competitive pressures from 
the discount stores are expected to force the supermarkets to introduce changes in the 
type of stores, design of stores and demand large amount of investments over the 
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Figure 6.3.  percentage in retailing 1995 and 2005 
 



















ource: Stockmann-Gruppen, 2005. 
 
 
The process of internationalization at the Danish retail market has seen several major 
mergers in the last couple of years. There is especially a trend towards increasing 
Nordic integration, helped in part by the completion of the Oresund bridge, linking 
Copenhagen with the Southern Swedish city of Malmö, which simplifies logistics and 
distribution networks throughout the region (European retail handbook 2003/04). 
 
A number of link-ups between the countries have been established. ICA Ahold of 
Sweden has acquired a 50 per cent stake in ISO, a small, Copenhagen-based, super-
market chain, while the Danish cooperative, FDB has taken its grocery operations into 
Coop Nordic as of January 2002, a joint platform for the grocery retail activities in the 
cooperatives in Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Also Dansk Supermarked has estab-
lished a joint venture with ICA Ahold to open Netto discount stores and Bilka hyper-
markets in Sweden and Norway. The Norwegian REMA-1000 has also got a foothold 
on the market. 
 
Retailers from outside the region have also begun to enter the region putting further 
competitive pressure on the Danish retailers. The German ‘hard’ discount chain ‘Lidl’ 
has started up in Denmark September 2005 with 13 stores and has now 26 stores.  
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After the first 6 month though Lidl has made several cutbacks on shelf space and staff 
is being fired (www.BerlingskeBusiness.dk., 20.03.06) 
 
The French retail giant Carrefour, the second largest in the world, has opened 5 new 
supermarkets in Norway under the name ‘MenyChampion’. All depending on their 
success Carrofour plans to expand in both Sweden and Denmark (Ritzau, 02/04). 
 
The worlds biggest retailer, Wall-Mart, expanded into Germany in 1997 buying 74 
stores from the Interspar chain, and in Great Britain in 1999 buying ASDA the coun-
try’s second biggest supermarket chain with a market share of 17 per cent. This move 
from an American based retailer into Europe made the retail sector in Europe talk of a 
‘Wall-Martizisation’, due to the big impact Wall-mart achieved on reducing costs es-
pecially through efficient logistics. However, Wall-Mart have had severe losses in 
Germany, where discount chains already has a market share of 33 per cent (Knorr & 
Arnt, 2003), so it seems more appropriate to talk of mergers and acquisitions in retail-
ing on a Pan-European level (Clarke et al., 2002). 
 
Where the overall picture on the surface concerning international competition, own-
ership, market share and store type, seems to illustrate diversification and horizontal 
spread in alliances along Pan-European partnerships, there is also a vertical concen-
tration taking place internally among the retailer organizations so the new alliances 
and acquisitions can be bound together efficiently. 
 
The consequences of this internal vertical concentration in the retailer organizations 
has been previously described in chapter 5.3, from the organic producer perspective in 
terms of growing difficulties negotiating terms of trade and growing pressures to ac-
cept written contracts describing strict exchange relations with fines for various con-
tract violations. 
6.2. The retail basket and its power assets 
Why has there been this shift in bargaining power away from producers towards the 
retailers? When interviewing the procurement officers in retailing concerning this 
claim from the producers they generally push it aside and say that:  
 
”We (the retailers) just try to make a good bargain”, or “competition is very fierce –  
especially from the discounters’, and since we are doing business we have to be tough  
to survive”. 
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This type of explanation can of course be true and embedded in its own logic, but 
does not give an answer to why there has been this shift in bargaining power. In the 
literature on supply chains the shift is often explained as a shift from producer driven 
chains to consumer driven chains (Gerrefi, 1994). The driver in the chain is deter-
mined by the location of market power and ability to keep up barriers of entry, but 
again it does not explain why the shift. 
 
However, reviewing the bargaining power shift from a property rights perspective, the 
key consideration becomes the nature of the implicit “contract” which exists between 
retailers and suppliers along the supply chain. Retailers simply clearly provide a ser-
vice of relative high utility from which firms in the supply chain benefit. In addition, 
because retailers can discriminate between the products of low scarcity that they of-
fer, or even become directly involved in the development and manufacture of certain 
products, they have effectively become backwards-integrated into the supply chain to 
a much greater extent than supplying firms have been able to integrate forwards. The 
term integration here is used in its widest context as it is clear that retailers have not 
taken over ownership of food suppliers, but they use formalized relationships and 
various slotting fees as described in chapter 5.3 to control the nature and the flow of 
the products involved. 
 
It may be argued that forward integration in the food industry is limited because con-
sumers prefer to find products in an array, which is far wider than the range of the 
normal food producer who often is specialized in a few products. The consumers are 
by the retailer offered a ‘basket of variety’, whereas the specialized producer is “only” 
offering a single or a few products to the retailer basket. 
 
Thus, it is efficient and desirable from the consumer’s viewpoint to have outlets, 
which have a wide range of products and are not specialized.  
 
The retailers and supermarket chains owe this position of strength in offering variety 
to a combination of two primary factors. The first is their site specificity, or store lo-
cation, which is linked to a certain population size and transportation network that ties 
it to the population. The second factor is their scale in store size and spread of stores. 
Their size allows them to advertise heavily to bring custom into their stores. Thereaf-
ter the scale of their business allows them to negotiate aggressively to get the best 
possible deals from their suppliers (Cox et al., 2002). 
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The retail scene has been changing rapidly the last ten years with increasing concen-
tration in terms of ownership and forms of integration and increasing internationaliza-
tion. Discounters are growing in market share as well as broadening their assortments, 
and new supermarkets are becoming bigger and have a broader assortment with vari-
ous fresh food, ‘shops-in-the-shop’ where employees give service to the customers, 
rather than just storing commodities on the shelves. 
 
A more international competitive environment drives these changes, and retailers are 
searching for ways to create an image of loyalty, trust and pleasant environment for 
consumption. 
 
It is a combination of these changes on the retail scene together with consumers seek-
ing variety, that the organic producers shall develop new entrepreneurship and appro-
priate critical assets offering the retailers a ‘basket of relative high utility and scar-
city’. 
6.3. The organic producer basket: The case from the discount chain Netto in 
2005 
To create an organic basket, that hands over critical assets to organic producers in 
their transactions with retailers, has to, as a starting point, acknowledge why and how 
the retailers get their bargain power. Secondly, it is important to acknowledge that the 
intensive competition among retailers is forcing them to find new ways to profile 
themselves on other matters than pure price and efficiency. From the theories on per-
fect market competition we know that emphasising price and efficiency will lead to a 
contested market, and in turn lead to the dissipation of the available profits. This in-
sight on the structural forces in a market economy opens up for new opportunities to 
suppliers focusing on critical assets that can acquire and exploit supply chain bargain 
power.   
 
Organic farming has in relation to critical assets a very strong and respected brand 
concerning consumer trust, ethical food procurement and various quality attributes. 
For retailers in a competitive environment forced to emphasize primarily on effi-
ciency and price, employ economies of scale and scope and accumulate in size as well 
as become trans-national, organic products as a brand can offer some very important 
critical assets with high utility to the retailers.  
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The case from the discount chain ‘Netto’ is an example of how the ‘organic basket 
concept’ has been implemented in reality, and so far been a success creating new 
space for organic producers and suppliers in retailing. 
 
In 2004 the ‘National organic association’ brought 22 organic firms and manufactur-
ers together with the discount chain Netto to help each other understand better the re-
quirements and specificities in production and retailing. The result of various meet-
ings and seminars was an agreement on making an organic campaign launched by 
Netto and their 334 outlets during 12 weeks throughout the year 2005. The 12 weeks 
have different themes where different organic products connected to the themes are 
promoted. For example one theme is “Fair trade – make a good deal” promoting vari-
ous organic products under the fair trade logo. Another is “convenience”, “health” 
and “your farm shop” where organic products have been promoted in relation to the 
themes. 
 
Besides the regular organic products that Netto has on a daily display, the customers 
were also presented for new products where some of them were tested as spot market 
products. The purpose was to give new and small organic producers and/or suppliers a 
chance to present and test their products for a larger consumer market. 
 
Before and parallel with the weeks of promotion Netto’s lifestyle magazine “Kiwi” 
had articles and recipes related to the themes and organic products sold. Press releases 
were send out to various newspapers, and Netto’s homepage as well as the homepage 
of the National organic association informed about the campaign. During the cam-
paign the logo of Netto (a black dog on a yellow background) had the Danish organic 
brand (a red letter ‘Ø’) placed as a dog tag, and the ‘organic Netto dog’ was printed 
on a number of distribution trucks belonging to Netto.  
 
The campaign was also being used by Netto as a test of consumer reactions, consumer 
tastes, and the director of the Netto discount chain have already after the third theme 
(week nine in 2005) announced that they would expand their organic assortment 
(www.okologi.dk). 
 
The ‘National organic association’ is hoping that the campaign could break the stag-
nation in organic food sales, and create a domino effect spreading to the other retail-
ers like in 1993, when FDB launched its discount promotion and helped boost sales in 
all organic products.   
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What is also new in this campaign is that Netto in a parallel move will try to launch 
organic products in their 57 discount stores in Sweden, and try to expand its sales of 
Danish organic products.  
 
What the National organic Association has done is first of all to lower the transaction 
costs for Netto as a buyer in collecting and giving information to its organic suppliers. 
Secondly, the National organic association has promoted a basket of variety offering 
them specific ownership with relatively high utility and scarcity. The value effect will 
accordingly to the theories applied in this research only be temporarily, but to recon-
figure the existing structure of power in producer – retailing transactions, the produc-
ers have appropriated the necessary mechanisms: product innovation, process innova-
tion, and supply chain innovation. 
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Conclusion and perspectives 
The analysis on the development of the Danish organic vegetable chain took its start-
ing point from the position that organic vegetable producers will encounter some of 
the same economic market pressures on above normal profits as the conventional pro-
ducers do. The countermoves from organic producers would then be expected to be of 
the same kind as found in conventional farming with growth in farm size and output 
per farm as well as a decline in the number of organic farms over time. 
 
Quantitative calculations as well as qualitative interviews with comparisons among 
organic and conventional carrot producers as a case study regarding terms of trade 
and development in consumer prices all showed that the organic carrot producers on 
an average have been under economic pressure. Indirectly, this would have an affect 
on the profit margin forcing the ones with the highest production cost to leave produc-
tion. Since 2000 organic vegetable farms producing carrots have declined, and the 
ones staying in the market have grown in size and increased output per farm. The re-
sults hereby confirmed hypothesis number one that the above normal profits in or-
ganic farming are only temporary for producers operating in open competitive mar-
kets. 
 
The market power in the supply chain to exercise this economic pressure on the or-
ganic vegetable producers was revealed through the qualitative interviews as coming 
solely from the retailer node. Hypothesis number two, that market power in a negotia-
tion based coordinated food production and distribution system would be exercised 
from both the input factor node as well as the retailer node could not be confirmed in 
relation to the organic vegetable chain. 
 
The qualitative interviews revealed also that the bargain power at the retailer node 
have been increasing over the years, and is exercised especially through the various 
and variable control mechanisms concerning marketing fees, obligation fees for rent-
ing specific retailer packaging systems, time of return payment from deliverance and 
opening fees for having access to new retail stores, all of which the producers have to 
pay. Furthermore, the producers were claiming that the retailers were putting pressure 
on the producers to start accepting written contracts, whereas normally they are ver-
bal. In this regard the organic vegetable producers seem to follow a general interna-
tional trend where the governance structure between fruit and vegetable producers 
and retailers are moving away from verbal supply agreements to written contracts. 
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In relation to the governance structures between producer and retailer it was examined 
if there were any differences concerning agro-commodities and their different dura-
bilities. There was found no difference in the governance structure comparing organic 
iceberg salad and organic carrots. Hypothesis number three could therefore not be 
confirmed in relation to the chosen commodities and governance structure of the or-
ganic vegetable chain. 
 
However, this left the organic iceberg salad producers with a position of asymmetric 
information and a need to build up confidence towards the retailers. If a procurement 
officer claimed that a certain percentage of the salad heads supplied had to be thrown 
away within the first six days, then the producer has to carry the costs. After six days 
the responsibility for discarding any salad heads was placed at the retailer. 
 
The future prospect for the organic vegetable producers to regain control over their 
products as a critical resource valued high in utility terms and in the same time deliv-
ering something relatively scarce or unique in ownership along the supply chain 
would be to cooperate more closely promoting the ‘organic basket’. 
 
Organic farming has in relation to their products a very strong and respected brand 
concerning consumer trust, ethical food procurement and various quality attributes. 
For retailers in a competitive environment forced to emphasize primarily on effi-
ciency and price, employing economies of scale and scope and accumulate in size as 
well as become trans-national, organic products as a brand can offer some very im-
portant critical assets with relatively high utility and scarcity to the retailers. Retailers 
as a market channel for organic food are important since they cover 80 per cent of all 
organic sales in Denmark. 
 
The case from the discount chain ‘Netto’ is an example of how the ‘organic basket’ as 
a concept has been implemented in reality. What the National Organic Association 
(NOA) has done by coordinating an organic sales promotion with Netto and 22 or-
ganic suppliers, is first of all they have lowered search and information costs for both 
Netto and suppliers. Secondly, the National Organic Association has by promoting 12 
themes towards the consumers on organic products created a basket of variety offer-
ing both Netto and suppliers specific ownership with relatively high utility and scar-
city. The value effect will accordingly to the theories only be temporarily, but to re-
configure the existing structure of power in ‘producer – retailing’ transactions, the or-
ganic producers have appropriated the necessary mechanisms: product innovation, 
process innovation, and supply chain innovation. 
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A second opportunity to promote the organic basket and expand sales of organic 
vegetables could also be through alternative sales channels. The most successful type 
up to now has been the E-trading company Aarstiderne with a combination of box 
schemes and the internet. The success lies primarily in that E-trading build up around 
selling food in a ‘virtual’ supermarket has endless shelf space contrary to a real su-
permarket. E-trading companies can therefore offer its customer access to segments of 
speciality products from in theory all kinds of food firms. The advantage of E-trading 
food companies lies in the fact that retailers today do not sell food, but space for the 
suppliers. Those commodities with the highest turnover in money value are the ones 
that get access to the shelves of the supermarket, and thereby excluding others. Al-
though the E-trading companies have endless shelf space, they have their limitations 
within logistics. Where supermarkets have the advantage of offering economies of 
scope and scale to customers being mobile and coming to them, the virtual E-trading 
store has to transport real food to each of its individual customers.  
 
A third possible approach implementing the ‘organic basket’ concept to change or 
levelling out the retailer bargain power in favour of the producers was revealed trough 
the interviews of key players among the producers in packaging. Some of these play-
ers were planning to create a basket of variety in supply through a trans-national net-
work of organic producers/packagers. In this way the increasing bargain power of the 
trans-national buyer organizations in retailing could be counter balanced by the pack-
agers. The organic producer trans-national network could lower transaction costs for 
the retailers in relation to purchasing as well as secure their need for scale. The pro-
ducers/packagers would in the same time be able to appropriate more control and 
ownership of a critical supply chain resource with relatively high utility and scarcity 
and thereby secure residuals and hence power.  
 
A fourth possibility would be for the National Organic Association to use the experi-
ence from the Netto case, with the organic food service companies focusing espe-
cially on the private market. Again various themes related to the characteristics of the 
organic food like health, local, trust, personal, handcraft, fair trade and luxury could 
be applied and promoted. The theme promotion should in the same time be targeted at 
solving some of the presently important constraints within organic food service con-
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Annex 1: 
Adresses and websites: 
 





Phone: 75 69 11 17 
www.barritskov.dk
 
Dan Organic A/S 
Vesterbjergvej 1 
DK-7280  Sønder Felding 






DK-8462  Harlev J. 





DK-5792  Årslev 
Phone: 65 90 15 10 
 
Svanholm Estate 
Svanholm Allé 2 
DK-4050  Skibby 
Packing,  
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Søris I/S 
Sørisvej 2a 
DK-3650  Ølstykke 
Phone: 47 33 4017 
www.soeris.dk
 
Tange Frilandsgartneri A/S 
Tange Søvej 42 
DK-8850  Bjerringbro 




Adress same as Barritskov Gods 




v/ Michael Balle 
Grønvej 105 
Volderslev 
DK-5260  Odense S. 




Coop Denmark A/S 
Roskildevej 65 
DK-2620  Albertslund 
Phone: 43 86 43 86 
www.coop.dk
 
Dansk Supermarked Gruppen 
Bjødstrupvej 18 
DK-8270  Højbjerg 













Flint & Hvid’s 
Rovsingsgade 80 
DK-2200 KBH. N 
Phone: 35 86 10 46 
 
Frydenholm A/S 
Ørsted Bygade 8 
DK-4622  Havdrup 





DK-8850  Bjerringbro 
Phone: 86 68 64 44 
www.solhjulet.dk
 
Økologiske Grønne Torv 
Hvedemarken 3 
DK-3520  Farum 

















Future supply of organic foods 
 
 
1. Name of firm: 
 
2. Type of firm: 
Number of employees  ___ Full time ___ Part time,   
season ___________ 
 
      
3. C/O:   




Type1 ? seed ? seedlings  
Name of firm(s) 
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Type1 ? supermarkets 
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10. Future prospects: 
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